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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment and final 
judgment issued by the District Court. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction under 78A-3-102 U.C.A. The case was transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals under 78A-4- l 03(2)G). 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Duane Boren, Jr. 
(B) Standard of review: A trial court decision to admit 
evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. Murdock v. 
Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39,,I 25, 982 P.2d 65. 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion to Strike. Record at 000667-000678 (hereinafter Rec 000667) 
2. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' Breach of 
Trust Action? 
(B) Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate 
only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgments under the same standard applied by the trial courts, according no 
particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether 
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the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains. 
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec 000615-000638. 
3. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Action? 
(B) Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate 
only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgments under the same standard applied by the trial courts, according no 
particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether 
the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec 000615-000638. 
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4. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' Request for 
Accounting? 
(B) Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate 
only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgments under the same standard applied by the trial courts, according no 
particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether 
the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P .2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec 000615-000638. 
5. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' Request for 
Declaratory Judgment? 
(B) Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate 
only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgments under the same standard applied by the trial courts, according no 
particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether 
the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec 000615-000638. 
6. (A) Issue: Did the District Court improperly grant the 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees? 
(B) Standard of review: The appropriate standard for 
reviewing equitable awards of attorney fees is abuse of discretion." Fisher v. 
Fisher. 2009 UT App 305, ,r 8, 221 P.3d 845 
(C) Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees. Rec 000777-000782. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Constitutional Provisions: None 
2. Statutory Provision: 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-103 
( 1) In this chapter: 
(a) "Action," with respect to an act of a trustee, includes a failure to act. 
(b) "Beneficiary" means a person that: 
(i) has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent; 
or 
(ii) in a capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment 
over trust property. 
( c) "Charitable trust" means a trust, or portion of a trust, created for a 
charitable purpose described in Subsection 7 5-7-405(1 ). 
( d) "Environmental law" means a federal, state, or local law, rule, 
regulation, or ordinance relating to protection of the environment. 
( e) "Interests of the beneficiaries" means the beneficial interests provided in 
the terms of the trust. 
(f) "Jurisdiction," with respect to a geographic area, includes a state or 
country. 
(g) "Power of withdrawal" means a presently exercisable general power of 
appointment other than a power exercisable only upon consent of the trustee 
or a person holding an adverse interest. 
(h) "Qualified beneficiary" means a beneficiary who, on the date the 
beneficiary's qualification is determined: 
(i) is a current distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or 
principal; or 
(ii) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or 
principal if the trust terminated on that date. 
(i) "Resident estate" or "resident trust"means: 
(i) an estate of a decedent who at death was domiciled in this state; 
(ii) a trust, or a portion of a trust, consisting of property transferred by will 
of a decedent who at his death was domiciled in this state; or 
(iii) a trust administered in this state. 
G) "Revocable," as applied to a trust, means revocable by the settlor without 
the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest. 
(k) "Settlor" means a person, including a testator, who creates, or contributes 
property to, a trust. If more than one person creates or contributes property 
to a trust, each person is a settlor of the portion of the trust property 
11 
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attributable to that person's contribution except to the extent another person 
has the power to revoke or withdraw that portion. 
(I) "Spendthrift provision" means a term of a trust which restrains both 
voluntary and involuntary transfer or encumbrance of a beneficiary's 
interest. 
(m) "Terms of a trust" means the manifestation of the settlor's intent 
regarding a trust's provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may 
be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial 
proceeding. 
(n) "Trust instrument" means an instrument executed by the settlor that 
contains terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto. 
(2) Terms not specifically defined in this section have the meanings 
provided in Section 75-1-201. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-105 
( 1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter 
governs the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the 
rights and interests of a beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust 
prevail over any provision of this chapter except: 
(a) the requirements for creating a trust; 
(b) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the 
purposes of the trust; 
( c) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its 
beneficiaries; 
(d) the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under Sections 75-7-
410 through 75-7-416; 
( e) the effect of a spendthrift provision, Section 25-6-14, and the rights of 
certain creditors and assignees to reach a trust as provided in Part 5, 
Creditor's Claims-Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts; 
(f) the power of the court under Section 75-7-702 to require, dispense with, 
or modify or terminate a bond; 
(g) the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 75-7-1008; 
(h) the rights under Sections 75-7-1010 through 75-7-1013 of a person other 
than a trustee or beneficiary; 
12 
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(i) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding; and 
U) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for commencing a 
proceeding as provided in Sections 75-7-203 and 75-7-205. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-801 
Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust 
expeditiously and in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes 
and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-802 
( 1) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the 
beneficiaries. 
(2) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as 
provided in Section 7 5-7-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction 
involving the investment or management of trust property entered into by the 
trustee for the trustee's own personal account or which is otherwise affected 
by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is 
voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless: 
(a) the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust; 
(b) the transaction was approved by the court; 
( c) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time 
allowed by Section 75-7-1005; 
( d) the beneficiary consented to the trustee's conduct, ratified the transaction, 
or released the trustee in compliance with Section 7 5-7-1009; or 
( e) the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the 
trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee. 
(3) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or 
management of trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict 
between personal and fiduciary interests if it is entered into by the trustee 
with: 
(a) the trustee's spouse; 
(b) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses; 
( c) an agent of the trustee, including but not limited to an attorney, 
accountant, or financial advisor; or 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·,J 
( d) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, or a 
person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that 
might affect the trustee's best judgment. 
( 4) A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern 
trust property but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the 
trustee retains significant influence over the beneficiary and from which the 
trustee obtains an advantage is voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee 
establishes that the transaction was fair to the beneficiary. 
(5) A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages 
in the trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and 
fiduciary interests if the transaction concerns an opportunity properly 
belonging to the trust. 
( 6) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or 
investment trust to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a 
capacity other than as trustee is not presumed to be affected by a conflict 
between personal and fiduciary interests if the investment complies with the 
prudent investor rule of Section 75-7-901. The trustee may be compensated 
by the investment company or investment trust for providing those services 
out of fees charged to the trust. 
(7) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar 
interests in other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries. If the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other 
form of enterprise, the trustee shall elect or appoint directors or other 
managers who will manage the corporation or enterprise in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries. 
(8) This section does not preclude the following actions by the trustee: 
(a) an agreement between the trustee and a beneficiary relating to the 
appointment or compensation of the trustee; 
(b) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee; 
( c) a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, 
conservatorship, or guardianship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in 
which a beneficiary has an interest; 
( d) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial service institution 
operated by the trustee; 
( e) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust; 
(f) collecting, holding, and retaining trust assets received from a trustor until, 
in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made, even 
14 
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though the assets include an asset in which the trustee is personally 
interested; 
(g) acquiring an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any 
trust capacity, holds an undivided interest; 
(h) borrowing money to be repaid from the trust assets or otherwise; 
(i) advancing money to be repaid from the assets or otherwise; 
G) employing persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or 
agents, even if they are associated with the trustee: 
(i) to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee's 
administrative duties or perform any act of administration, whether or not 
discretionary; or 
(ii) to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; 
(k) if a governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in 
United States government obligations, investing in those obligations, either 
directly or in the form of securities or other interests, in any open-end or 
closed-end management type investment company or investment trust 
registered under the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, _li 
U.S.C. Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if: 
(i) the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to 
United States government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully 
collateralized by United States government obligations; and 
(ii) the investment company or investment trust takes delivery of the 
collateral for any repurchase agreement either directly or through an 
authorized custodian. 
(9) The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with 
respect to any proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered 
into by the trustee. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-808. 
( 1) A trustee shall keep adequate records of the administration of the trust. 
(2) A trustee shall keep trust property separate from the trustee's own 
property. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a trustee shall cause the 
trust property to be designated so that the interest of the trust, to the extent 
feasible, appears in records maintained by a party other than a trustee or 
beneficiary. 
15 
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( 4) If the trustee maintains records clearly indicating the respective interests, 
a trustee may invest as a whole the property of two or more separate trusts. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-811 
( 1) Except to the extent the terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trustee 
shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about 
the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to 
protect their interests. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances, and 
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the trust a trustee shall promptly 
respond to a qualified beneficiary's request for information related to the 
administration of the trust. 
(2) Except to the extent the terms of the trust provide otherwise, a trustee: 
(a) upon request of a qualified beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the 
beneficiary a copy of the portions of the trust instrument which describe or 
affect the beneficiary's interest; 
(b) within 60 days after accepting a trusteeship, shall notify the qualified 
beneficiaries of the acceptance and of the trustee's name, address, and 
telephone number; 
( c) within 60 days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of the 
creation of an irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowledge 
that a formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable, whether by the death 
of the settlor or otherwise, shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of the 
trust's existence, of the identity of the settlor or settlors, of the right to 
request a copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to a trustee's report as 
provided in Subsection (3 ); and 
( d) shall notify the qualified beneficiaries in advance of any change in the 
method or rate of the trustee's compensation. 
(3) A trustee shall send to the qualified beneficiaries who request it, at least 
annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of the trust property, 
liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the amount of the trustee's 
compensation or a fee schedule or other writing showing how the trustee's 
compensation was detennined, a listing of the trust assets and, if feasible, 
their respective market values. Upon a vacancy in a trusteeship, unless a 
cotrustee remains in office, a report must be sent to the qualified 
beneficiaries by the former trustee, unless the terms of the trust provide 
otherwise. A personal representative, conservator, or guardian may send the 
16 
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qualified beneficiaries a report on behalf of a deceased or incapacitated 
trustee. 
( 4) A qualified beneficiary may waive the right to a trustee's report or other 
information otherwise required to be furnished under this section. A 
beneficiary, with respect to future reports and other information, may 
withdraw a waiver previously given. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a contentious dispute regarding the 
operations and dealings of a family trust. The Plaintiffs are qualified 
beneficiaries under the Trust. Defendant David L. Boren is both a qualified 
beneficiary and Trustee of the Trust. Defendant Sherron L. Boren is the 
current beneficiary of the Trust and designated Defendant David L. Boren as 
Trustee. Plaintiffs have requested an accounting of the Trust and the 
removal of Defendant David L. Boren as Trustee based on his breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of trust. 
Proceedings: On September 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their 
complaint. The Defendants answered. On June 9, 2015, Defendant David 
L. Boren filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' filed their 
response on June 29, 2015 which included an Affidavit of Duane Boren Jr. 
and multiple documents that were produced in discovery. On July 2, 2015, 
Defendant David L. Boren filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Duane 
17 
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::.J 
Boren, Jr. On July 6, 2015, the Defendant David L. Boren filed a Reply 
Memorandum on the Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 7, 2015, 
Plaintiffs' file a Response Memorandum to the Motion to Strike. On July 
10, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren filed his Reply Memorandum on the 
Motion to Strike. Defendant Sherron L. Boren through various pleadings 
joined the Motions of Defendant David L. Boren. 
The Court issued a Ruling and Order on September 10, 2015 granting 
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. The 
Court issued the final Order on Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 17, 2015. The Court issued the final Order on the Motion to 
Strike on September 17, 2015. On October 15, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a 
Notice of Appeal. On November 30, 2015, the Court issued a Ruling and 
Order on the Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees. On December 17, 
2015, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Plaintiffs' First Appeal for lack of 
a final order or judgment. The Court issued a Judgment on the Attorney's 
Fees on January 6, 2016. Plaintiffs filed their second Notice of Appeal on 
January 15, 2016 appealing the final judgment and the underlying orders. 
The appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals on February 29, 2016. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1) Duane Boren, Sr. died on December 27, 1992. Rec 000068. 
2) Prior to his death, Duane Boren, Sr. created the Duane Boren 
Family Living Trust on March 20, 1980. Rec 000067-000068. 
3) On February 15, 1993, Duane's wife, Sherron L. Boren was 
appointed as the personal representative. Rec 000068-000069 
4) Several handwritten strike-outs confuse the issue as to who is 
the actual Trustee of the Trust. Rec 000068, 000157, 000162. 
5) The original Trust named Settlor' s children, Sharrol Ann 
Anderton, Duane Boren, Jr., and Mary Ellen Blanchard as Co-Trustees. Rec 
000157 
6) The name of Terry Lee Monks is added in handwriting, and the 
successor co-trustee paragraph is marked with a large "X". Rec 000157 
7) On January 25, 1985, the Trust was amended to replace Co-
Trustees with Sherron L. Boren as Trustee. Rec 000162. 
8) A strike-out is handwritten in to replace Sharron L. Boren with 
David L. Boren as Trustee, further confusing the issue of who was actual 
Trustee. Rec 000162. 
9) Nevertheless, upon the death of the Settlor in 1992, Defendant 
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'\J) 
David Boren assumed the duties as "de facto trustee," primarily because 
during informal probate, acting Personal Representative, Defendant Sherron 
L. Boren, named Defendant David L. Boren, as Trustee, as authorized per 
paragraph 6.29 of the Trust. Rec 000141. 
10) Plaintiffs, are qualified beneficiaries. Rec 000157-000158 
11) Clark B. Allred represented Sherron L. Boren in the estate 
matter. Rec 000169 
12) The Trust properties and asset interests were distributed to 
Defendant David L. Boren, as Trustee. Rec 000141. 
13) The Plaintiffs trusted their brother, David Boren as trustee. Rec 
000214. 
14) The Trust provides that, if the Spouse survives, the Trustee 
shall divide the Trust assets into two separate trusts, designated as the 
"Marital Deduction Trust" and "The Family Trust." Rec 000147-000150. 
15) The Martial Deduction Trust had, as its initial corpus, a 
"fractional" share of all of the Trust assets. Rec 000147. 
16) After dividing the Trust assets, the Trustee was to pay, to 
Settlor's spouse, net income during the spouse's lifetime, with discretion to 
apply principal for spouse's benefit. Rec 000148 
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17) Sherron Boren, as Trustee for the Marital Deduction Trust has 
transferred property from the Marital Deduction Trust to Defendant David L. 
Boren. Rec 000299, 000305, 000311, 000317, 000324, 000330, 000337, 
000344,000375,000389,000401 
18) These transfers to Defendant David L. Boren have been to him 
personally, not as a trustee to either the Marital Deduction Trust or the 
Family Trust. Id. 
19) The Family Trust portion includes the principal of an undivided 
one-half(½) interest of property and mineral interests, to be administered in 
equal shares to the beneficiaries, Trustor's six (6) children, DAVID L. 
BOREN, DUANE BOREN, JR., SHARROL ANN BOREN nka SHARROL 
ANN ANDERSON, MARY BOREN nka MARY BLANCHARD, and 
TERRY BOREN nka TERRY CHRISTENSEN. Rec 000166. 
20) As qualified beneficiaries under Utah Code 7 5-7-103, Plaintiffs, 
through their attorney, requested an accounting from Defendants. Rec 
000217. 
21) Trustee's counsel provided tax returns for the years 2008, 2010, 
and 2011, but did not include receipts or an accounting to include proceeds 
from the cattle herd, mineral income distributions, sale of elk and deer 
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permits, and details relating to property management fees. Rec 00021 7. 
22) On October 4, 2011, Defendant David L. Boren, acting as 
Trustee, entered into a "Farm Agreement" assigning him as "Farmer 
entitled" to sole distributions. Rec 000218. 
23) Defendant David L. Boren paid himself multiple distributions 
in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 to operate the farm, taking from the Trust 
property leases for equipment and purchases for the farm. Rec 000218. 
24) Despite the Farm owning its own equipment, Defendant David 
L. Boren leased farm equipment from himself for the operation of the Farm. 
Rec 000218 
25) Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 13, 2014 alleging 
five causes of action; 1) Breach of Trust; 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 3) 
Accounting; 4) Negligent Misrepresentation; 5) Declaratory Judgment. 
Record (Rec) 000001-000011. 
26) On September 29, 2014, Defendant David L. Boren filed an 
answer through his attorney, Clark B. Allred. Rec 000018-000024. 
27) On October 24, 2014, Defendant Sherron L. Boren filed an 
answer through her counsel, Joel D. Berrett. Rec 000030-000035. 
28) On November 20, 2014, Defendant David L. Boren served his 
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initial disclosures containing 1489 pages of documents. Rec 00003 8 
29) On December 4, 2014, Defendant David L. Boren sent notice of 
his intent to depose the Plaintiffs and Sherron Boren on December 15 2014, 
and December 16, 2014. Rec 000041-42. 
30) On January 20, 2015 and January 21, 2015, Defendant David L. 
Boren took the depositions of all Plaintiffs and Defendant Sherron L. Boren. 
Rec 000046. 
31) On March 12, 2015, Plaintiffs served Discovery Requests on 
the Defendant. Rec 00051-000054. 
32) On April 6, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren provided 
supplemental disclosures. Rec 000057. 
33) On April 9, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren responded to the 
Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests. Rec 000060-000061. 
34) On June 9, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren filed their Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Rec 000064-000182. 
35) Defendant Sherron L. Boren joined the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on June 22, 2015. Rec 000185-000211. 
36) On June 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Response to Summary 
Judgment on June 29, 2015. Rec 000595-000609. 
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3 7) Plaintiffs' Response included the Declaration of Duane Boren, 
Jr. with attachments. Rec 000214-000589. 
38) On July 2, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren filed a Motion to 
Strike Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. along with a supporting 
Memorandum. Rec 000612-000638. 
39) On July 6, 2015, Defendant David L. Boren filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Rec 000641-000664. 
40) On July 7, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant David L. Boren's Motion to Strike. Rec 000667-000678. 
41) Defendant Sherron L. Boren joined Defendant David L. 
Boren's Motion to Strike and the Defendant David L. Boren's Reply 
Memorandum. Rec 000681-000689. 
42) On July 10, 2015m Defendant David L. Boren filed a Reply 
Memorandum on the Motion to Strike. Rec 000692-000698. 
43) On September 4, 2015, the Trial Court issued a Ruling and 
Order granting the Defendants' Motion to Strike and the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec 000710-000719. 
44) On November 30, 2015, The Trial Court issued a Ruling and 
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Order on the Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Rec 
000815-000818. 
45) Final Judgment was entered in this matter on January 6, 2016. 
Rec 000852-866. 
46) Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on January 15, 2016. Rec 
000869-000870. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court should not have struck the Declaration of Duane 
Boren, Jr. The Trial Court should have considered both the statements 
contained in the Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. and the Exhibits that were 
submitted with the Declaration. That evidence shows that Defendant David 
L. Boren, as Trustee for the Duane Boren Family Living Trust, commingled 
Trust property with his own without maintaining the appropriate records. 
The evidence shows that Defendant David L. Boren used Trust funds to 
purchase personal property for himself. The evidence shows that Defendant 
David L. Boren used the Trust to pay the expenses for the Farm, while 
Defendant David L. Boren benefited from the operation of the Farm. The 
Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment on the Plaintiffs' claims for: 1) breach of trust; 2) breach of 
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fiduciary duty; 3) accounting; 4) declaratory judgment to remove Defendant 
David L. Boren as Trustee for the Duane Boren Family Living Trust. The 
Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTION TO STRIKE 
The appellate review the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of 
proffered evidence leading to the grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. On 
re Rights to Use o[All Water), 1999 UT 39, ,ij 26-27, 982 P.2d 65 Rule 56 
requires a party opposing summary judgment to do so with admissible 
evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr .. Inc .. 2004 UT App 354, -U: 20, 
101 P.3d 371. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
1. The Declaration did not contradict Duane Boren, Jr's 
Deposition. 
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The Trial Court abused its discretion when it struck the Declaration of 
Duane Boren, Jr. The Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's 
ruling on this issue. 
The Trial Court misapplied the rulings of Webster v Sill and Gaw v 
State to ru·le that Duane Boren, Jr., took a clear position during his 
deposition and that he was bound by that position. Rec. 000711-000712. 
Webster states: 
As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition is generally a 
more reliable means of ascertaining the truth than an affidavit, 
since a deponent is subject to cross-examination and an affiant 
is not. That does not mean, however, that in summary judgment 
proceedings, a deposition should be accorded greater weight 
than an affidavit. The purpose of summary judgment is not to 
weigh the evidence. But when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may 
not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation 
of the discrepancy. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 
(Utah 1983) ( cites omitted) see also Magana v. Dave Roth 
Constr., 2009 UT 45, ,r 39 n. 33, 215 P.3d 143; 
Duane Boren, Jr. took no clear position as to what facts existed which may 
support his case. At the time of his deposition, Duane Boren, Jr. specifically 
told opposing that he had only skimmed over the documents that he had 
been provided. Rec. 000676-000677. The Trial Court also acknowledged 
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that the Duane Boren, Jr. had only skimmed the documents provided to him. 
Rec 000711. The Trial Court was concerned that by claiming only to have 
skimmed the documents, the deponent was promoting ignorance. That was 
not the circumstances in this case. 
David Boren argued that Duane Boren, Jr. testified that he had no 
facts, to support his case during his deposition. Rec 000071-000072. The 
record before the Trial Court contradicts that assertion. During his 
deposition, Duane Boren, Jr., as best he could, did provide examples of 
Defendant David Boren' s misuse of the trust. Duane Boren, Jr., testified 
that "there is a lot of farm equipment that is missing. I wonder if it is valid 
for him to set his self up with funds from the Trust." Rec 000676. Later 
when asked what assets David Boren distributed to himself, he testified; 
"Water rights, the brand, cows, hay, equipment." Although David Boren 
constantly argued that Duane Boren, Jr. testified that he had no facts, the 
deposition of Duane Boren, Jr. contradicts that assertion. Duane Boren, Jr. 
testified to the facts as he knew them at the time of deposition, he just did 
not have all of the documentary evidence to support those facts. 
David Boren sent their initial disclosures containing 1489 pages of 
documents on November 20, 2014. David Boren then sent notice that he 
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wanted to depose the Plaintiffs and Sherron Boren on December 15 and 16, 
slightly more than 3 weeks after they sent the documents. Ultimately, 
because of scheduling conflicts, the depositions occurred on January 20, 
2015 and January 21, 2015. The Defendants final supplementation of 
documents did not occur until April 6, 2015, after the Plaintiffs sent their 
discovery requests. Duane Boren, Jr., took the honest approach and testified 
in his deposition that he was waiting for his counsel to review the documents 
before he could provide an adequate response. Knowing this information, if 
David Boren wanted more specific information on Plaintiffs' causes of 
action, he should have sent interrogatory requests to the Plaintiffs, which 
would have been required to be supplemented prior to the close of discovery. 
The facts that supported the Plaintiffs' actions were within the documents 
provided by David Boren. Those facts were not yet fully known to Duane 
Boren, Jr. at the time of his deposition. 
This case is superficially similar to Gaw v. State ex rel. Dep't of 
Transp., 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Like Gaw, this case was at the 
summary judgment phase. The Trial Court in Gaw, in essence adopted the 
position proffered by the Defendant. The Utah Court of Appeals, citing to 
Webster, stated that the Trial Court used too stringent of a standard when 
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analyzing discrepancies between deposition testimony and affidavits. The 
Trial Court need only look for a plausible explanation. "We do not have to 
be persuaded by the explanation or even find it compelling. As long as it is 
plausible, the fact finder should be allowed to weigh the credibility of the 
explanation." Gaw v. State ex rel. Dep't ofTransp., 798 P.2d 1130, 1141 
(Utah Ct.App.1990)., See also Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 141 P.3d 
624, 627-28 (Utah Ct.App.2006). This case is different because not only 
was a plausible explanation offered by Duane Boren, Jr., the explanation 
itself was offered at the time of the deposition. Duane Boren, Jr. did not 
wait to until he submitted an affidavit to explain why he could not provide 
the details requested by David Boren. Duane Boren, Jr. told David Boren 
during his deposition that he was waiting for his attorney to review the 
documents. This was not only a plausible explanation, it was also a 
reasonable course of action in this litigation. 
Because the Plaintiffs offered relevant and competent admissible 
evidence in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's decision to strike the 
Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. 
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2. The statements contained in the Declaration are admissible 
and supported by admissible documents. 
Affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment must be made on 
personal knowledge. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Trial Court determined that 
the Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. contained no "facts on pertinent issues, 
but merely opinions of Duane Boren, Jr.". Rec 712. The Trial Court took 
issue with paragraph 20 of Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. finding that it 
merely expressed an opinion. Although the statement the Plaintiffs will 
concede that the paragraph contains a degree of opinion, its purpose was to 
provide foundation. The statement explains how Duane Boren, Jr. arrived at 
the facts in paragraphs 21 to 27. Rec 000217-000218. Likewise, 
paragraphs 23 and 28 provide background for how the declarant obtained 
information for the following paragraphs. Those paragraphs in the 
Declaration were there to provide proper foundation as required by Rule 
56(e). 
The Trial Court found no evidence to support the statement that David 
Boren purchase a four wheeler with trust money for his own benefit. The 
Trial Court made this determination because the Trial Court found no 
evidence that the equipment wasn't owned by the Trust. Rec 000712. The 
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Trial Court failed to acknowledge the major issue of this litigation has been 
David Boren' s failure to appropriately account for the assets of the Trust. 
The Plaintiffs have been begging for an appropriate accounting from the 
Trust. Rec 000217. Duane Boren, Jr. supported paragraph 27 with a 
document that shows the Trust purchased a 4 wheeler. Rec 000428. David 
Boren has provided no documents showing that the Trust owns the 4 
wheeler. Plaintiff cannot prove the negative here, because evidence of the 4 
wheeler's ownership is clearly within the possession of David Boren. This 
creates a factual dispute which makes this fact highly pertinent to the 
resolution of this issue. 
Paragraph 21 states that "On October 4, 2011, Defendant David L. 
Boren, acting as Trustee, entered into a "Farm Agreement" assigning him as 
"Farmer entitled" to sole distributions." The Farm Agreement was attached 
to the Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. Rec 000249-000250. The Farm 
Agreement defined the owners as Sherron Lea Boren, David Len Boren and 
David Len Boren as Trustee of the Duane Boren Trust. The Trust 
Agreement defined the Farmer as David Len Boren. Paragraph 3 states that 
the Owners will rent the Farmer's equipment and pay for the Farmers use of 
his personal vehicle, including repairs. Paragraph 4 states that the Farm is 
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entitled to all income received from the cattle. Paragraph 7 makes the 
Owners responsible for the expenses of the Farm. Paragraph 21 of the 
Declaration of Duane Boren further stated that; "Defendant David L. Boren 
paid himself multiple distributions for labor; $1,200.00 in 2008, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011 to operate the farm." This statement was backed up by Trust's 
Exhibit G. Rec 000254-000295. Paragraph 22 provided the ownership 
breakdown of the Farm. That statement was supported by Exhibit H. Rec 
000299. In paragraphs 23, 24, 25, Duane Boren, Jr. describes what he 
knows about the ownership of the cattle and the equipment. In paragraph 
26, using the ownership information from paragraph 22, Duane Boren, Jr. 
points out that although the Trust own 50% of the Farm, the Trust is paying 
100% of the expenses. The Declaration then supported that statement by 
Exhibit J. Rec 000424-000426 1• 
Likewise, the Trial Court determined that paragraphs 28 through 34 
are mere conclusions. Rec 000712. The statements in paragraphs 28 to 34 
are not conclusions, they are statements supported by documentary evidence. 
Rec 000218-000219. Paragraph 28 states that Duane Boren, Jr. reviewed 
1 The statement of Duane Boren, Jr. is further suppmted by Exhibit G at Rec 
0002 7 6 which shows the Trust paying the full BLM fees for Boren 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the tax returns. This simple statement not a conclusion rather it is a 
statement of foundation. Paragraph 29 states that the Trust received 
substantial income from oil and gas royalties for 2008 and 20142• That 
statement cited the Trial Court to Exhibit L, the tax returns for 2008-2014. 
Paragraph 30 stated that David Boren consistently operated the Farm at a 
loss. The Plaintiffs provided very specific information within Exhibit L 
which supported these statements including the amounts of the royalties, the 
farms losses and the specific page numbers where the information could be 
found. Rec 000670-000671. Again, Duane Boren, Jr.'s statement was a 
knowledgeable summary of very specific information contained within 
Exhibit L. 
Paragraph 3 2 and its Exhibit G shows the horse related expenses of 
the Trust. Like the 4 wheeler, evidence of ownership of the horses is within 
the possession of the Trustee. Duane Boren, Jr. stated that his understanding 
was that the Trust did not own any horses but David Boren did own horses. 
Duane Boren, Jr. is competent to testify as to his understanding of the 
ownership of the horses, especially considering that there is no evidence in 
Livestock, as the handwriting notes in Exhibit J at Rec 000425. 
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the record that the Trust owns any horses. Absent David Boren providing 
some evidence to the contrary, this factual issue is highly relevant to whether 
David Boren was using Trust funds to support his personal horses. 
Paragraph 33 is a statement that the Plaintiffs have hired an 
accountant to try and determine what is going on in the Trust. Plaintiffs fail 
to see how that statement is conclusory. 
The Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. contained 13 attached Exhibits. 
It was the Exhibits which showed the mishandling of the Trust by David 
Boren. Many of the Exhibits were produced by the Defendant David Len 
Boren. The Defendants did not challenge the authenticity or accuracy of any 
of the Exhibits, yet the Trial Court apparently did not consider the 
information contained within these Exhibits because the Trial Court simply 
exclude that relevant information from the Trial Court's consideration of 
summary judgment. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it struck the Declaration of 
Duane Boren, Jr. and the attached Exhibits. The Court of Appeals should 
reverse the decision of the Trial Court on the Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
2 The use of the word substantial may be conclusory, but the remaining 
portions of the statement are factual. 
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231,235 (Utah 1993). The 
appellate courts give no deference to the trial court's determination to grant 
or deny summary judgment because such is a question of law, and the 
appellate courts view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 6, 177 P .3d 600. Plaintiffs request that the Court of 
Appeals review the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment based on the 
facts in the record. 3 The Trial Court found that there was no evidence to 
support any of the Plaintiffs claims. The Trial Court provided very limited 
legal analysis' of the Plaintiffs' actual claims and instead relied on the 
position that no evidence existed to support any claims. 
1. The Court Should Not Have Granted Summary Judgment 
on the Plaintiff's Breach of Trust Claim 
3 Plaintiffs acknowledge that if the Court of Appeals reverses the Trial Court 
on the Motion to Strike issue, the Court of Appeals could simply remand this 
matter for further consideration. Rather than delaying this matter further, the 
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Under the breach of trust claim, in paragraph 3 5 of the Complaint the 
Plaintiffs alleged the foil owing: 
35. Trustees have breached the Trust agreement by, among 
other things, commingling their personal property with Trust 
property for their own personal gain but to the detriment of the 
Trust assets and the qualified beneficiaries, self-dealing, failing 
to keep adequate records of Trust administration, failing to 
provide an adequate accounting to Plaintiffs, and refusing to 
communicate with Plaintiffs regarding the administration of the 
Trust. 
The Trial Court acknowledged that David Boren "commingled his own 
assets, in livestock and land, with the Trust." Rec 000718. The Trial Court 
however found nothing illegal about this commingling. The Trial Court's 
decision is incorrect for several reasons. 
First, the commingling of assets is permitted if the Trustee maintains 
adequate records 
§ 75-7-808, states that: 
( 1) A trustee shall keep adequate records of the administration 
of the trust. 
(2) A trustee shall keep trust property separate from the trustee's 
own property. 
Plaintiffs request that the Court of Appeals reverse the Trial Court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
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(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection ( 4 ), a trustee 
shall cause the trust property to be designated so that the 
interest of the trust, to the extent feasible, appears in records 
maintained by a party other than a trustee or beneficiary. 
( 4) If the trustee maintains records clearly indicating the 
respective interests, a trustee may invest as a whole the property 
of two or more separate trusts. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-808. 
Maintaining adequate records are part of the overall duties of a Trustee. In 
this case, there is no evidence that David Boren kept any records to maintain 
the separate identity of the Trust property from his own. The Trial Court 
pointed the title reports provided by the Plaintiffs, however, the Trial Court 
failed to acknowledge that it was the personal property, the cows, the hay, 
the equipment, the horses, the recreational vehicles that lack documentation. 
Plaintiffs have no evidence to support that the 4 wheeler was not owned by 
the Trust because David Boren failed to keep the necessary records. 
Plaintiffs have no evidence as to horses owned by the Trust, because David 
Boren failed to keep the records. Plaintiffs have no idea if the Trust own 30 
cows or zero cows, because David Boren failed to keep those records. In 
short, David Boren failed to "cause the trust property to be designated so 
that the interest of the trust, to the extent feasible, appears in records 
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maintained by a party other than a trustee or beneficiary." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-808. 
Second, the Trial Court determined that the Trust permitted the 
commingling of property. Section 6.20 created two separate trusts upon the 
death of the Settlor. Rec 000147. A marital deduction trust and a family 
trust was created upon Duane Boren's death. Rec 000148-000150. Section 
7.20 of the Master Trust allows for the comingling of the separate trust's 
assets. Rec 000152. Nothing in the Trust agreement allows David Boren to 
commingle his own personal property with that of the Trust. 
Even if the Court were to determine that commingling under these 
circumstance were permitted, Section 7 .20 also mandates that the income 
generated would be allotted proportionately based on contributions. As 
demonstrated previously, the Family Trust incurred all of the expenses of the 
Farm, yet David Boren reaped all of the income. Assuming David Boren 
commingle his assets with the Trust assets under §75-7-802(8)(g), he was 
still bound by the duties of loyalty and fair dealing. By failing to adequately 
record his interests and those of the Trust and by imposing the expense 
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liabilities on the Trust without taking his pro rata share of those expenses, 
his permissible commingling became impermissible. 
David Boren not only commingled assets, he participated in self-
dealing transactions. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A trustee has a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of a trust. A 
trustee's duty of loyalty requires the trustee to administer the 
trust "solely in the interest of the beneficiary. As such, a trustee 
is not permitted to engage in self-dealing, or to place himself in 
a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his 
duty to the beneficiaries. The prohibition against self-dealing 
does not depend upon proof of bad faith, but is absolute so as to 
avoid the possibility of fraud and the temptation of self-interest. 
Absent authorization from a court with jurisdiction over the 
administration of the trust or consent of the beneficiaries, any 
transaction involving self-dealing by a trustee is not only prima 
facie invalid, but is voidable by the beneficiaries, regardless of 
any loss suffered by the trust estate, the payment of valuable 
consideration, or the existence of good faith .. Even if the 
beneficiaries consent, the transaction is voidable unless the 
trustee has disclosed to the beneficiaries all the material facts 
which he knew or should have known concerning the 
transaction and the transaction was fair and reasonable in all 
respects. Wheeler By & Through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 
758, 759-60 (Utah 1988) (cites, footnotes and quotation marks 
omitted). 
As Trustee for the Family Trust, David Boren was prohibited from 
benefiting personally from the Trust. In this case, not only did David 
Boren benefit personally from the Trust, he did so to the determinant 
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of the Trust. The Trust paid for his personal vehicle. The Trust paid 
for his horses. The Trust paid him a salary. 
Finally, as demonstrated previously, the Trust reaped 
substantial income from oil royalties, yet David Boren failed to 
provide any accounting as to the oil revenue generated by the Trust. 
Although the Defendants may contest these facts, the existence of 
these facts are sufficient to support the Plaintiffs claims of breach of 
trust to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
2. The Court Should Not Have Granted Summary Judgment 
on the Plaintifr s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim states: 
42. Trustees breached that fiduciary duty by, among other 
things, commingling their personal property with Trust property 
for their own personal gain but to the detriment of the qualified 
beneficiaries, self-dealing, and failure to invest Trust assets and 
property as a prudent investor in a reasonable manner. 
The most concerning actions of David Boren have been his self-dealing 
transactions. A trustee has a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of a trust. A 
trustee's duty of loyalty requires the trustee to administer the trust solely in 
the interest of the beneficiary. As such, a trustee is not permitted to engage 
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in self-dealing, or to place himself in a position where it would be for his 
own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries. Wheeler By & Through 
Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1988). It is clear that David 
Boren placed himself in a position that would benefit himself through the 
Farm Agreement that he signed with himself and Defendant Sherron Boren. 
He did so without the prior knowledge or consent of any of the other 
beneficiaries. The Trial Court mistakenly required that the Plaintiffs prove 
. 
at summary judgment that David Boren mismanaged the Farm or otherwise 
acted in bad faith. Rec 000718. The act of self-dealing by a Trustee is in 
itself a breach of fiduciary duty. Based on these facts, the Plaintiffs claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty are sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
3. The Court Should Not Have Granted Summary Judgment 
on the Plaintiff's Request for an Accounting 
Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the David Boren was required to 
administer the trust expeditiously and in good faith, in accordance with its 
terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries. Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-801. "A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the 
beneficiaries." Utah Code§ 75-7-802(1). A beneficiary is defined as a 
person who has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or 
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contingent. Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-103(1)(b), (b)(i). Each of the Plaintiffs 
qualifies as a beneficiary of the Trust. As qualified beneficiaries under the 
Trust, each Plaintiff was entitled to a yearly report of the trust property, 
liabilities, receipts, and disbursements. Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-811(3), See 
also Beal v. Beal, 300 P.3d, 769, 772 (Vt Ct, App. 2013). The Trial Court 
ruled that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to any accounting because under 
the Trust, only the income beneficiary was entitled to an accounting. Rec 
000717. The Trial Court's interpretation of the Trust is inconsistent with the 
statutory requirements of the Trustee. Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-105(2) states 
that unless otherwise provided for in this chapter, the terms of the trust 
prevail. That section then places several limits on the terms of a trust, 
including terms which would alter: 
(b) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance 
with the purposes of the trust; 
( c) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of 
its beneficiaries; Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2). 
Although the terms of the Trust mandate an accounting for the income 
beneficiary under Section 9 of the Trust, that Section does not restrict or 
otherwise contravene the requirements of Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-811(3) 
that all beneficiaries receive an accounting. 
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4. The Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the 
Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment Claim 
Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment states: 
57. Pursuant to Utah's Declaratory Actions Act, Utah Code 
Section 78B-6-401, et seq., Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
declaratory judgment declaring, among other things, that it is in 
the best interest of the Trust and all qualified beneficiaries that 
Defendants be removed as Trustees of the Trust, and replenish 
the Trust for any damages from their breach. 
If at Trial it is determined that any of the Plaintiffs' claims are successful, 
the Court should reserve the right to remove David Boren as Trustee for the 
Family Trust. If any of the Plaintiffs preceding three claims survive 
summary judgment, the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment should 
be reserved fro Trial. 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Trial Court used the appropriate factors under Shurtleff v. United 
Effort Plan Trust, 2012 UT 47,289 P.3d 408. The Trail Court's decision 
however, rested on the Trial Court's September 8, 2015 Ruling and Order. 
Rec 000816. The obvious issue is that if the Ruling and Order are reversed 
in any manner, then the Trial Court's Ruling and Order on Attorney's Fees 
should also be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's ruling on the 
Motion to Strike the Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. After considering the 
evidence contained within that Declaration, the Court of Appeals should 
reverse the Trial·Court's grant of Summary Judgment. Finally, The Court of 
Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's grant of attorney's fees pending 
further resolution of this matter. 
Dated: July 12, 2016. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Certificate of Compliance 
The undersign does hereby certify that this Brief complies with the word 
count and font limitation. The Brief uses Times New Roman with a 14 point 
font. Based on the word count program of my Word program, this Brief 
contains 9201 words. 
Dated: July 12, 2016. R~~ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
RUSSELL T. MONAHAN hereby declares that he is the attorney for 
the Plaintiffs herein; and that he served the attached APPELLANTS 
BRIEF upon: 
Clark Allred 
Allred, Brotherson & Harrington, 
148 South Vernal Ave, Ste IO 1 
Vernal, UT 84078 
D. Karl Mangum 
Mangum & Holt 
P.O. Box 1878 
Vernal, UT 84078 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States 
mail in Salt Lake City, Utah on: July 12, 2016. 
Executed on: July 12, 2016. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the fore going is 
true and correct. 
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1N THE EIGHTH JUDJCJAL DISTRJCT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UT AH 
Sharrol Anderton, Mary Blanchard, Terry 
Christensen, and Duane Boren, Jr., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
David .L. Boren, and Sherron L. Boren, as 
individuals and .as Trustees for the Duane 
Boren Family Trust, as amended, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 143000048 
Judge SAMUEL :P. CIDARA 
This matter is before the Court on .the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court will also consider the Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration .of Duane Boren Jr. 
The .Defendant David L. Boren .is represented by counsel, Mr. Clark Allred .. The 
Defendant Sherron .L. Boren is represented by separate counsel, Mr. Joel Berrett. The Plaintiffs 
are jointly represented .by counsel, Mr. Russell Monahan. The Defendants filed separate Motions 
for each issu~, the Summary Judgment and the Motion to Strike. The Defendants, positions and 
arguments on the Motions are largely the same. Therefore, the Court will treat them as one 
Motion coming from the Defendants combined. The Motions have been fully briefed, and no 
oral argument was requested. The Court has reviewed the Motions and the pertinent law and is 
prepared to rule. 
First, the Court will decide the Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Duane Boren 
Jr. The Plaintiffs' depositions were taken, including Duane Boren Jr.'s, on January l 9 and 20, 
000710 
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2015. All ofthe Plaintiffs testified that they were unaware of any facts that would support their 
claims. The Plaintiffs were asked by opposing counsel for facts to support the specific 
allegations set forth in thefr Complaint. The Plaintiffs admjtted they did not have a~y support for 
the allegations, or admitted that they had not reviewed the accountings and supporting documents 
provided to them concerning the .trust. On that basis, the Defendants moved for summary 
judgment. 
In opposition to the Motion for Swnmary JudgmentJ 'the Plaintiffs' provided the 
declaration of Duane Boren.Jr., attempting to create a dispute of material fact concerning whether 
the Defendants acted improperly in administering the Trust. The Defendants argue that the 
Plaintiffcannot now contradict his testimony by affidavit. The Defendants cite to case law which 
disallows affidavits made after sworn testimony which contradicts that testimony. See Webster 
v. Still, 675 P .2d 1170 (Utah 1983). ~'[T]he general rule in Utah is that an affiant may not raise 
an issue of fact by his own affidavit whicb contradicts his deposition unless he can provide· an 
explanation of the discrepancy.', Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Ut. App. 1990). The 
.Plaintiffs argue that according to Webster, the general rule only applies when a _party ''takes a 
clear position in a deposition." Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. The Plaintiffs argue that Duane 
Boren Jr. did not take a clear posltion during the deposition. The Plaintiffs allege that Duane 
Boren Jr. had-only skimmed the documents concerning the Trust, and was relying on counsel to 
review the documents and find the facts to support his claim. 
The problem with the Plaintiffs' argument is that it promotes a deponent, s ignorance 
during a deposition when he is subject to cross examination. According to Plaintiffs, by merely 
claiming no knowledge during a deposition, a person could later provide his statement through 
affidavit, without the threat of cross examination. The Court finds that the general rule outlined 
000711 
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in Webster was not intended to create such a result. A person ·cannot avoid being deposed and 
avoid answering questions by claiming no knowledge, only to .subsequently file a self-serving 
affidavit in order to avoid summary judgment. The Court also finds that Duane Boren Jr. did 
take a clear position in his deposition. His position was he had no facts to support bis claims. 
Alternatively~ the Declaration does not provide facts on the pertinent issues~ but merely 
the opinions of Duane Boren Jr. Forinstance, Duane Boren Jr. asserts as fact paragraph 20: 
"After reviewing ·the infonnation provided by the attorney for the Trustee!I it is apparent that 
Defendant David L. Boren has used the assets of the Family Trust.for .his .own benefit in violation 
of fiduciazy duty to the remaining beneficiaries." That is not a fact but a claim made by the 
Plaintiff The Plaintiffs claim that the facts following paragraph 20 are the -support for his 
opinion. However, facts 21-25, -even if true do not support the clrums .. Paragraph 27 is a 
conclusion that is not supported by the exhibit it refers to. The exhibit shows .a payment for a 
four wheeler but there is no evidence that the four wheeler was not owned by the Trust. 
Paragraphs 28-34 are mere conclusions~ with no facts, or where facts are stated, those facts do 
not support the cause of action. Therefore, even if the Court were not striking the Declaration 
based on the general rule that an affidavit cannot be used to contradict d~position testimony, the 
Court would not find any issue of material fact raised by the Declaration. 
The Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Duane Boren Jr. is granted. 
Undisputed Material Facts 
1. Duane Boren and his wife Sherron Lea Boren had 6 children, Sbarra] Anderton, Mary 
Blanchard, Terry Chirstensen, Duane Boren Jr., David Boren and Luck7 Boren. Lucky 
Boren died April 1, 2001. 
2. Duane Boren and his wife, Defendant, Sherron Lea Boren prepared a Master Trust 
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Agreement, dated March 20, 1980. Duane Boren was the Settlor and the Agreement is 
signed by Sherron Lea Boren and Duane Boren. There was also prepared a Joinder 
Agreement dated March 20, 1980, which was signed by Mr. Boren. The onJy asset in the 
trust when it was created was a life insurance policy. 
3. Duane Boren and Sherron Lea Borren, on January 25, l 985., signed the First Amendment 
to the trust agreement changing paragraph 4 of the joinder agreement to appoint Sherron 
Lea Boren as trustee. Later Duane Boren ·crossed out Sherron Lea Boren and -wrote in 
David Boren. 
4. On August 28, 1990, Duane Boren.signed a Second Amendment to the Trust Agreement 
designating David Boren as successor trustee and changing the ·distribution -of the assets. 
5. Duane Boren died on December 27, 1992. 
6. After the-death of Duane Boren the family met and his will was read and all family 
members were provided a .copy of the will and trust documents. 
7. Duane Boren's estate was probated in Duchesne County Utah as case number 933800004. 
8. 
Sherron Boren was appointed personal representative and based on the terms of Duane 
Boren's wil1 the assets set forth in the inventory were distributed to David Boren as 
Trustee of the Duane Boren Trust. 
Duane 'Boren owned an undivided one half interest in the properties distributed to the 
Trustee. The other one half interest was owned by Sherron Lea Boren. 
9. The properties distributed to the Trustee were undivided interests in real estate with some 
equipment and mineral rights. 
J 0. The trust assets were to be used for the benefit of and at the direction of Sherron Lea 
Boren during her life. 
000713 
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11. From 199310 the present David Boren, as trustee, has managed the trust properties as 
welJ as properties owned by his mother, Sherron Lea Boren with her input. 
J 2. From 1993 to 2012 none of the Plaintiffs made any request for an accounting from David 
Boren. 
13. Sherron Lea Boren was involved in the decisions regarding the trust and its .assets from 
1993 to the present. 
14. In 2012 Daniel Sam, an attorney for Duane Boren Jr. and possibly the other Plaintiffs 
requested information from the trustee. 
15. Mr. Sam and aIJ of the Plruntiffs were provided an inventory of the trust., accountings for 
trust and tax returns from 2008 through 2011. Since that date accountings and tax -returns 
for 2012, 2013 and 2014 have been .provided. In addition the back up documents for the 
accountings ·and tax returns were made available for examining and copying. 
16. Accountings for time periods prior to 2008 were not provided as ·the trustee does not ·have 
records for those earlier time periods. Efforts were :made to obtain bank records and what 
records the bak still had were provided to the Plaintiffs. 
17. In 2014 four of the.children (the Plaintiffs) sued their brother, David Boren, and their 
mother, Sherron Lea Boren. 
18. On January 19 and January 20, 2015, the depositions of the Plaintiffs were taken 
regardi~g the allegations in the complaint. 
19. The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges at paragraph 20 that the Defendants had stolen and 
embezzled money from the Trust. All four Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions 
that there were no facts to support the allegation. 
20. Paragraph 22 of the complaint alleges that the Defendants forged documents. AJJ four 
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Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions that there were no facts to support the 
allegation . 
.21. Paragraph 22 of the complaint alleges that David Boren distributed property to himself. 
The Plaintiffs provided no evidence in support of the allegation. The title reports 
provided to a]l the Plaintiffs showed real property .titled in the trust. 
22. Paragraph 22 also alleges that David .Boren coerced his mother Sherro.n Lea Boren to sign 
documents. All four Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions that 'there were no facts 
to support the a11egation. All children also agreed that their mother is and was competent. 
Mr.s. Boren denies that she has been coerced in signing any -document. 
23.. At_parB:graph 23 of the complaint Plaintiffs alleged that David L. Boren.gave.himself an 
unauthorized.salary, ·paid for equipment for his own needs out of the Trust property and 
.caused a diminution of Trust assets. AU four Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions 
thatthere were no-facts to s~pport the.allegation. 
24. At paragraph 24 of the complaint .Plaintiffs .allege that the accountings were untruthful, 
unenforceable and inaccurate and that David Boren had .failed to provide .receipts and 
account for all monies taken from the Trust property. All four Plaintiffs admitted .during 
their depositions that there were no facts to support .the allegation. In fact, the Plaintiffs 
admitted at their depositions that they had not reviewed the accountings or the documents 
that were provided. 
25. At paragraphs no. 30 and 35 of the complaint, concerning an alleged failure to account 
and-communicate, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have failed to keep ad.equate 
records and failed to keep the Plaintiffs reasonably'informed of the Trust and failed to 
provide accountings. AU four Plaintiffs admitted duri-ng their depositions that there were 
000715 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J 
no facts to support the a11egation, and that they had not reviewed the accountings .and tax 
returns provided to them. 
26. At paragraphs 30, 32, 35, 42 of the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the Trustees 
commingled Trust property with their own property. All four Plaintiffs admitted during 
their depositions that there were no facts to support the allegation. 
27. At paragraphs 31 and 32 the Plaintiffs complain that the Trustees did not administer the 
~ Trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The Plaintiffs admit tha1 their mother 
Sherron Lea Boren is presently the only .income beneficiary. Sherron Lea Boren agrees 
the Trustee has administered the Trust for her benefit and at her.direction and input. 
28. At paragraphs33 and 42 the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have failed to administer 
the Trust as a prudent person. AH four Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions that 
there were no facts to.support the allegation. 
29. As a fourth cause of action the Plaintiffs aJl~ge that the Defendants negligently 
misrepresented to the Plaintiffs facts regarding the administration of the Trust. All four 
Plaintiffs admitted durin_g their depositions that there were no facts to support the 
all egatj on. 
Analysis 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine -issue ofmaterial fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers ArchiJects v. 
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and 
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schell/er, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). 
The basis for the Defendants' Motion for Summary is that the 'P1aintiffs have provided no 
000716 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence to support their allegations in their Complaint. Further, the Defendants argue that there 
is no obligation to provide accountings to the Plaintiffs under either the Trust or statute. The 
Defendants argue the Plaintiffs ·have provided no evidence the Defendant David Boren' s 
management of the farm was in violation of the terms of the Trust. Finally, the Defendants argue 
that the Plaintiffs' complaint of commingling is not supported factually and is without merit 
according to law. 
The Court agrees with the Defendants' argument. The Plaintiffs have not provided 
evidence to support their claims. The Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that there is 
evidence to support their claims of forgery, coercion and misrepresentation, As for accounting, 
the Defendant has provided an accounting to the Plaintiffs after they made their statutory request 
.for .the year 2012. The Defendant also _provided accountings for all years back to 2008. 
However, the Trust Agreement does not require the Trustee to provide accowitings to the 
Plaintiffs. According to the Trust Agreement paragraph 9: "The trustee shal] keep all accounts 
and records of the .trusts created herein and annually, or oftener, shall render to the current 
income beneficiaries statements showing all receipts, .disbursements, and distributions of both 
principal and income of the trust estate.,, The Plaintiffs are not income beneficiaries. 
Consequently, under the terms of the trust, they are not even entitled to the accounting they have 
received. 
Next, the Plaintiffs, claim that the Trustee failed to title property in the name of the Trust 
is directly contradicted by the exhibits attached to the Plaintiffs' opposition. The exhibits are 
title reports from the Daggett and Duchsene County recorder's offices showing property titled in 
the name of the Trust. Further, the bank account records attached to the Plaintiffs' opposjtion are 
titled in the name of the Trust. The Plaintiffs have furnished no evidence of equipment, property, 
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or money that belongs to the Trust which is not titled in the name of the Trust. 
The Plaintiffs have offered no evidence or argument that the Defendant has commingled 
property with the Trust contrary to Jaw or the tenns of the Trust. The Defendant owns a 
percentage interest of farm land which is owned or shared with the Trust and the Defendant 
Sherron Boren. Undoubtedly, the Defendant bas commingled his own assets, in livestock and 
land, with the Trust. However, there is no shomng by the Plaintiffs the Defendant's actions are 
unlawful. The Trust provides for the Defendant's actions, and the authorization of the Defendant 
Sherron Borren, in allowing the fann to be operated the way has been. The pertinent statute does 
not disallow the Defendant's actions. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to show any 
vaongdoing on the part of-the Defendants in iheir operation ofthe fann. 
Final1y, there is.no evidence offered to support the Plaintiffs' claim ofbad faith 
concerning the management of the fann. The Joinder Agreement to the Trust Agreement allows 
the Defendant Sherron Lea Boren to make decisions concerning the operation of the fann, 
including paying a salary to a manager of the farm. There is no evidence to support the argument 
that the farm has been operated in contravention to Defendant Sherron Lea Bore1f's wishes, or 
that the salary paid to the Defendant David Boren for managing the Trust was not ~ppropr.iate. 
The fact the farm had a tax loss, without more, does not support a claim of mismanagement. 
UJtimately, there are no facts to support the Plaintiffs' claims. 
The Defendants' Motion for Swnmary .Judgment is granted. 
Dated this_!}__ day of ~ 2015. BY=~~ 
7 
SAMUEL P. CHIARA, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 143000048 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: 
·EMAIL: 
·EMAIL: 
Date: 
ClJI.RK B ALLRED vernal@abhlawfirm.com 
JOEL D BERRETT j dblaw@ubtanet. com 
RUSSELL T MONAHAN russ@cooklawfirm.com 
0.9/08/2015 /s/ KELLY SNOW 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
AND ELECTRONIC SERVICE 
I1 Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED, 
BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P. C. attorneys for Defendant, Davi~ L. 
Boren, herein and hereby certify that I served the attached ORDER 
{Motion For Summary Judgment} , on Plaintif·f and Defendant Sherron 
L. Boren, by electronic filing on this the 10th day of September, 
2015, to: 
Russell T. Monahan 
COOK & MONAHAN, LLC 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 84102 
Joel D. Berrett 
Attorney at Law 
Po Box 262 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
ls/Cheree Brotherson 
Cheree Brotherson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
AND ELECTRONIC SERVI.CE 
I , Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED, 
BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P. C. attorneys for Defendant., David L. 
Boren, herein and hereby certify that I served the attached .ORDER 
(Motion to Strike Declaration of Duane Boren Jr, ) , on Plaint.iff and 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren, by electronic filing on this the 10th 
day of September, 2015, to: 
Russell T. Monahan 
.COOl( .& .MONAHAN I LLC 
323 South ·6'.00 East, .Suite 200 
Salt .Lake City, ·uta·h .34·102 
J oe.1 D . Berrett 
.Attorney at Law 
PO Box 262 
Roosevelt 4 Utah 8406£ 
ls/Cheree Brotherson 
Cheree Brotherson 
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The Order of Court is stated below: {'''?t~WJJ.Jr~~{~ \ 
Dated: September 17, 20]5 /s/ SAMqE~? · ·-\~:fJ 
02:40:34 PM Districf}~~.f ...... ,: .. tJ~:fg'~/ 
''t··{t-J1\}J$~~-,;' 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
BRADD. BROTHERSON - 10914 
MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540 
ALLRED, BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, David Boren 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
SHARROL ANDERTON, MARY 
BLANCHARD, TERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
and DUANE BOREN JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID L. BOREN and SHERRON L. 
BOREN, as individuals and as 
Trustees of the DUANE BOREN 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, as amended 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
(Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Civil No.: 143000048 
Judge: Samuel P. Chiara 
The above case came before the Court on a Notice to Submit 
requesting a ruling on Defendant, David Boren and Defendant, 
Sherron L. Boren's Motions for Summary Judgment. The Defendants 
are represented by separate counsel but the issues in their 
respective motions for summary judgment addressed the same 
issues and the same facts and argument. The motions had been 
fully briefed by all parties. 
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The Court entered its Ruling and Order on September 4, 2015 
setting forth its reasoning and analysis and granting the 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Based thereon the Court hereby Orders that the Plaintiffs' 
complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
Signed and dated as of the date indicated by the official 
seal and electronic signature of the Court located on the first 
page of this document. 
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The Order of Court is stated below: // /,fp':ij_;J~1'-\·· ... \ 
Dated: September 17, 2015 Isl SAMq£~lf;J~~-~~~R1 
02:40:49 PM District~~.µ,'ft,':,~4~ge/ 
~~{~!!)".~~}~i;'P;I' 
CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
BRADD. BROTHERSON - 10914 
MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540 
ALLRED, BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, David Boren 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
SHARROL ANDERTON, MARY 
BLANCHARD, TERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
and DUANE BOREN JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID L. BOREN and SHERRON L. 
BOREN, as individuals and as 
Trustees of the DUANE BOREN 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, as amended 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
(Motion to Strike Declaration 
of Duane Boren Jr.) 
Civil No.: 143000048 
Judge: Samuel P. Chiara 
The above case came before the Court on a Notice to Submit 
requesting a ruling on Defendant, David Boren and Defendant, 
Sherron L. Boren's Motions to Strike the Declaration of Duane 
Boren Jr. The Defendants are represented by separate counsel 
but the issues in their respective motions to strike addressed 
the same issues and the same facts and argument. The motions 
had been fully briefed by all parties. 
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The Court entered its Ruling and Order on September 4, 2015 
setting forth its reasoning and analysis and granting the 
Defendants' motions to strike. 
Based thereon the Court hereby Orders that the Declaration 
filed by Duane Boren Jr. be stricken. 
Signed and dated as of the date indicated by the official 
seal and electronic signature of the Court located on the first 
page of this document. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Sharrol Anderton, Mary Blanchard, Terry 
Christensen and Duane Boren, Jr., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
David L. Boren and Sherron L. Boren, as 
individuals and as Trustees of the Duane 
Boren Family Living Trust, as amended, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 143000048 
Judge Samuel P. Chiara 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Award Fees. 
The.Plaintiffs' Complaint contained a number of claims against Defendants alleging 
illegal and-improper management of the Trust. After the close of discovery, the Defendants 
moved for summary juqgment on all of the claims. By Ruling and Order dated September 8, 
2015, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that there was 
no evidence to support the Plaintiffs' claims. 
I-Jere, the Defendants request that their attorney's fees and costs expended in this 
litigation be awarded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. _§75-7-1004(1) and/or §78B-5 .. 825(1 ). 
Utah Code.Ann. §75-7-1004(1) slates: 
ln a judicial proceedjng involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as 
justJce and equit)1 may require, award costs and expenses, focluding reasonable 
attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the 
Page 1 of 3 
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subject of the controversy. 
In detennining whether to award costs and attorney's fees under the statute, the following factors 
are considered: 
(a) reasonableness of the parties' claims, contentions, or defenses; 
(b) unnecessarily prolonging litigation; 
( c) relative ability to bear the financial burden; 
(d) result obtained ~y the Htigation and prevaning party concepts; and 
(e) whether a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons in bringing or conduct of the litigation. 
Shurtlejfv. United Effort Plan Trust, 2012 UT 47, ~23, 289 P.3d 408; (quoting Atwood v. 
Atwood 25 P Jd 936 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)). 
The litigation was not unnecessarily prolongecl, and there is no evidence before the·Court 
on the Plaintiffs' relative ability to bear the financial burden of the litigation costs and attorney's 
fees. The Defendants were clearly the prevailing party in the matter. The Court dismissed all of 
the Plaintiffs' claims on summary judgment. In ruling on summary judgment, the-Court 
specifically found no evidence to support the Plaintiffs' claims. Furthermore, the Court found 
that the Plaintiffs failed to reasonably .investigate whether their claims were .supported by 
evidence, even when they had the relevant accountings and discovery materials to review. The 
Plaintiffs admitted they neglected to review the Trust account statements, tax returns, title 
reports, etc., 1n order to ensure their claims were supported by facts. The Court will again rely on 
the findings made in the September 81 20 l 5, Ruling and Order, and find the .Plaintiffs' claims and 
contentions were not reasonable. As a consequence, the Court will award the Defendants' 
Page 2 of 3 
000816 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attorney's fees and costs expended in defending against the Plaintiffs' Complaint, pursuant to 
Uta11 Code Ann. §75-7-1004(1). 
The Court does .not find that in addition, or in the alternative, the Defendants' attorney 
fees and costs can be awarded under Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825(1). Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-
.825( I) states: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without meri1 and 
not brought or asserted in good faith . . . . 
While the Defendants have likely shown the P]aintjffs' claims were without merit, they have not 
provided any evidence that the Plaintiffs 1 brought them in bad faith. Bad faith requires the 
Defendants show the P.laintiffs did not hold "an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
question." Warner v. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, .§37, 319 P.3d 7'11 (quoting Still S1anding 
Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, § 12, 122 P.3d 556). The Defendants have offered no 
evidence of the Plaintiffs' subjective intent. Therefore, the ·Court does not find that the Plaintiffs 
brought the claims in ,bad faith. 
The Defendants' Motion to Award Fees is granted. 
Dated this 3tJ day of ~ 
l 
,2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
SAMUEL P. CHIARA, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 143000048 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
.Date: 
CLARK B ALLRED vernal@abhlawfirm.com 
JOEL D BERRETT jdblaw@ubtanet.com 
RUSSELL T MONAHJ.\N russ@cooklawfir~com 
//- 3tJ •Jt>IS /i:f /Yl,JL,a 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 11/30/15 11: 57 :.26 
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CERTIFICATE OF 
ELECTRONIC SERVICE 
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED, 
BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P. C. attorneys for Defendant, David L. 
Boren, herein and hereby certify that I served the attached 
JUDGMENT, on Plaintiffs, by electronic filing on this the 3rd day 
of December, 2015, to: 
Russell T. Monahan 
COOK & MONAHAN, LLC 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
ls/Cheree Brotherson 
Cheree Brotherson 
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JOEL D. BERRETT #0307 
Attorney for Sherron L. Boren 
P.O. Box 262 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(435) 722-3606 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
SHARROL ANDERTON, MARY BLANCHARD, 
TERRY CHRISTENSEN and DUANE BOREN, 
JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID L. BOREN and SHERRON L. 
BOREN, as individuals and as 
Trustees of the DUANE BOREN FAMILY 
LIVING TRUST, as amended, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 143000048 
Judge Samuel P. Chiara 
THE ABOVE case came before the Court on a Notice to Submit 
requesting a ruling on Defendant, David Boren and Defendant, 
Sherron L. Boren' s joint Motion to Award Fees. The motion has 
been fully briefed by all parties and the Defendants had 
submitted their affidavits regarding the fees and costs incurred. 
The Court entered its Ruling and Order on November 30, 2015 
setting forth its reasoning and analysis and granting the 
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Defendants' Motion to Award Fees. 
Based thereon and the Affidavit regarding the fees and 
costs incurred the Court hereby awards Defendant, Sherron L. 
Boren judgment against the Plaintiffs for attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in the county of Five Thousand Forty Dollars and 
Zero Cents ( $5,040.00} . 
END OF DOCtJl,.,.tENT. IF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED BY THE JUDGE, 
THE OFFICIAL SEAL AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE BY THE COURT WILL 
APPEAR AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 7th day of December, 
2015, I personally caused to be delivered by electronic delivery 
through Green Filing a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT to: 
January 06, 2016 01 :06 PM 
Clark B. Allred 
Brad D. Brotherson 
72 N. 300 E. (123-14) · 
Roosevelt, OT 84066 
Russell T. Monahan 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, OT 84102 
/s/K. Shoell 
Secretary 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
BRADD. BROTHERSON - 10914 
MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON - 12540 
ALLRED, BROTHERSON & HARRINGTON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, David Boren 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
SHARROL ANDERTON, MARY 
BLANCHARD, TERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
and DUANE BOREN JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID L. BOREN and SHERRON L. 
BOREN, as individuals and as 
Trustees of the DUANE BOREN 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, as amended 
Defendants. 
JUDGEMENT 
Civil No.: 143000048 
Judge: Samuel P. Chiara 
The above case came before the Court on a Notice to Submit 
requesting a ruling on Defendant, David Boren and Defendant, 
Sherron L. Boren's joint Motion to Award Fees. The motion had 
been fully briefed by all parties and the Defendants had 
submitted their affidavits regarding the fees and costs incurred. 
The Court entered its Ruling and Order on November 30, 2015 
setting forth its reasoning and analysis and granting the 
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@ 
Defendants' Motion to Award Fees. 
Based thereon and the Affidavit regarding the fees and 
costs incurred the Court hereby awards Defendant David L. Boren 
judgment against the Plaintiffs for the attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in the amount of Twenty Thousand, Seven Hundred Eighty 
Two Dollars and Fifty Four Cents ($20,782.54). 
Signed and dated as of the date indicated by the official 
seal and electronic signature of the Court located on the first 
page of this document. 
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1 )1 "~~1W,l?.,,,~, .. ,.,P11/lt 
r' ··11f\ . .. t .. .,.·' ·. · · : ,·; .. 1 
·----
M/1!;·1•1:11 'l 'HUS'l' i'\GfmEMEN'I' 
'I'll J •; MhS'l'EI( 'l'HUS'J' /\UHECMENT j ! i l!>:cecu Led L.11 i !i d ,1 y 
o( /J , s I • t' ' l , B ·:,(', 1 uct~, ec:11 !..lie St1 LLlo1 /lilllll~d J I: Uh• 
JOH1tlc:1· /\gn, w111•~11l !Ji,,l,r!119 L<VCn dun, hcrow.u:h 1111d the: 'l'rur.:L<!, uel 
forth 1n U1 c s111 d Jo111der 119rcl < ..ment. 
l . ~L•J 11de r. /,grccmen t , 
!;hall i ncorpou, te: IJ\' this .::eforc,nce t haL c:erc.a.i.n clocu 111e11t e1,ti1.lecl 
" Jo.i.11der /1gn"e111e11t" ,-l!d.c.:h i u being e xe cuted conr.e111pon.1111iou!Jly , •1lh 
th i n Mil~ter 'l'ru~t Aqreemc11t . ln the even t thot two (/.) en ·rore 
J o.i. nlfer /1gree111c11Ls <1re e>:ecutc:d co nte111poi:a 11euus ly here ,d th ,111.ici, 
refer to th.Ls Ml 1!i t1.•r T r u5 t Ag reemen t , tJ1u1, this I-lu ster 'l' r1H::· 
A9recme 11t sh1J.l l lie com;Lru1:ic] so il!l t o cn,ote a scpa:-1Jt:e t:1c:;t. 
for each ,lOlndt>r /\\1rr,e111enl !;0 e xecuted . 'J'h.it is to :;uy , II Lw1; 
s cpu rate Ju 1 nee t' Ag re ,~men L9 arc ext::! c u Led ac ming two ~cpz1 rll t '.! 
Set t lors, a11d cacll separate Sec. tlor e>:ecutes this l-:1JI; ter 'l', u!.L 
Jl.greemen t, the11 i..J1js Mastci r Trust: Agreement shall be i nt~qvc tt: d 
so tl1at cwo scµar ~tc t rus ts nre create d hereby . 
2 . IJe [ ~ni tit>ll of 'l'e rms . 
2 . l. Sctt lor. '!'he term "Se tllor" shall 111e a11 tJ11• u1~iv.ldt1al 
named .i. n th e ,Jo i.ndc,r /•,greemer:t . ln the cuse of two o r nr.i n . Joinder 
Agrccmentr., tJ1 i !; Mas tcr 'l'rust !lgr.eement 5)11111 be con!1t.n1lHI ,,~ 
cnrntimJ two or mo r.e sepm:ute trust.!! and thiB Master 'l'r ust i,1.JrC!e-
ment uha J l l>e inte r prc:tccl indepcnclentl)' with respccl tu r:,11 h J o1ndc1 
Agreement and t:J1e SetLlors rm 111ed therein , 
'l'he term 1"l'ru!.l t.e t:- 11 nho.11 1111.! c:JJ 1 tJH 1.nUividunl 
or i ndivjdullls r,ilmcc in tJ,e Joinder Ayr.ecmt:!nc . In t.he c:ns · o f t~H-' 
or ,ro re co- 11u!.i l t.:,:.1:, :.he: .!:-: ingu.lnr cic:s 1c__mcJtion "Lrus t el-' 11 s !1,i ll r l•fer 
c:ol lccti vi:Jy Lti ,, J.1 c.:o-tr.ust.ecs , In tJie case of two o r 110,·~, 
Joincier 11,1rc,L·111c:111.!: , t.J,i.!l Mc:~tt:r 'l'ruu t 11y.ree111ent shul.l bi:· l' •111 sL 1ued 
/lyrccme11L :,Ii .. ! I i>l' 1i,t:c r p rete d i11clcpc11tln11LJy wjLh rc,sp<:c• ICJ , . .,c.;1; 
,... 
! 
,· 
.-; 
:•~ 
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,Joi11de.r /\gn?l,11:t•n!. oml tn<: Trustee or Cotn,stee n1,1ne d tilt 11. ;11 , 
2 . J, :c;J!~· 'l'he t:erm "Spouse" shall 111eu11 tl11· !11<.liv.idua l 
ln th!! case uf two tt! 1th.11 v .Jt;.11u.Jur 
,. 
t. 
I 
I· 
I 
:. 
/\<Jreen1e111:s, Ll,,_s v..o::t:ci: •rruGt /\grecment shnll L>e consti·ub·t iJ!, ~·reac111 ~ /; 
' ~~>•~ L.-• • -~ ! ,J 
Lwo o r mo r e i;i:pai:ntc 1:ruats . w 1d t;.lJi~( l-11,\Dtl! r •,r,ruu t A9rec1111:11t 11.bul,l J;,o,l1(;6f 
• ,, ~~~".9t ·l'<:;_r-f/:' i;/> ,.,.-,, ; I,\' ff •,').· 
.111terpreted indepe11dentl)' 1-1ith ro~pect . t;o cac,l;l,.,Joinde r /l\1roe111en t und ., 
' ' f'o'"I°" -
the Spouses 11l\meci ther~in , 
:i . '!'ru!.L Proper t y . Settlor heniby dtclan·s U1al 
Settler o,,,.nf; the Ji fe .insurance policic!I ilnd/or annui Ly conLr!lcts 
lisu,d i11 U,c si gm:d schedule an11cxed to tJ1e Joi!lder /1gree111cmt thal 
each such pol 11:y ;met/or c1nnuity contr c1ct contemporar,cr,usl\' hc:·c:~1iLh 
ls b<:.:.119 1110,!e p,1yahl1., to 'J'rustec 1:s pd.mary or conti11yt,:J! bi,n£·f ici1,r.y. 
All righLr; 1.t·:cc•1ved by 'J'.ru1:;tt, e z,s u n,sulL of such !JunL'~Jr i,Jt'/ 
cicsign11t1.ern, i nci ud i ng policy p.roceed!I, shall consti tute I.he Ln1st 
. ~_gz:qp e r ty 1111d shal J he 
., • ,. ,·< :J 
r, . 
• :;: , . ..)\er._e ?-_na:ter eY.preS!Jf;!tl 
'. .. 
/ ,!•!' he r einafter provided. 
held in trust for tl,e uses a11d µurr,uses 
...... 1.--:.· : .. :~·.- ~r .... ; .. ;... · 
and s~j-~~w~ •.tf,f. co_r,di.~i~ns 0~ thC' tl'US l 
··~·-· -~ 
The t r uDt:,~,P.li_O..P;.;JY nl130.,, shall i11clude all 
p r operty rc:ceivcd as z I.Jerwi.:.ciary of Settler's 1dll; and :tll other 
assets pres en ~lj• o.r later trims fer r ed to the trust . Settlor 
res erves thri nyh t to Settler or to any other person a t any time , by 
de e:d, wllJ, or oth<,rwise, to add to the print:ipal of th e, t1: ust 
es::at..e cr<:n~.ec! r,e ,·cin and any P!_;Op_erty so ac!ded shnl; be held, 
ad111inisten,d, and dis t r i buted unde r the terms of this ,,y,,;em,,nt . 
. , . Basically .:.11 Inter Vives Revocable U11fundcl! L.1.(e 
.I ns u rance '!'rust Which Also ls Intended us a Pour-Over Will 
-Recc ptncle . o,,~ :i r:olly, Settler intends to cro2te an i n t <. r vJ vos 
revoc.:ablt- u11fumh~d li fe insurance, t rui;t , SettJ.o.r r ea; erv1 ·!< L!,e 
riqhr (witl:out 1:hc· pe r mi5sion o :. •rru5tee , any bent· f iciu;:, or 
any oth"'r person) Lo revo~.e this tru!it in w.hole or .in p.1:t l,y 
wc:.~.te:, 1:,•·Ln11n<>nl or othc= action clcnrly inconsisten:- ,;ilh t.!H~ 
con ti 11ua11c1: of' 1111 or n rX)rtion of t.llis trust (such as ;, ch ,,11 <J t: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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of all li l "J,c,rtH111 of Ll,e l i !:e in!;un111ce !!Olicy ,,ncl/o r ..i111i.li1, 
conln.1ct t 11·111 1 r1,·1 .1 1y c1,.•1 i gn1.1tJons to nomeone othr.'r tli:111 T:u• 1Ll-~ - -1. 
$eLt.lor rt~:;1•1 vt·:, Lhe r ryh L (w.i Lhout r11c permiss i on of 1111-,• T:·11:;u,e, 
any benef.ic Jury, or uny o ther pcrno11J t o umend thi!l t L'ut,;L .in nny 
manner Whilt!;oever. A8 ~ part0•,ot:~~~ f>?.;·ttrs~~'it,,rcnd or t·P.voke the ·i 1,;~•:1 
trusc, !;et LJor , 1d tit ri:spcct tol',,3/1.Y[ lifc 0 ,insu::-nnce puli c y , i:et.i renion t. ': 
contract o r ilnnuicy , or si111ililr asoet, opocificalJy 1:eoui: veu the 
power co t:h,111yE- the IJcneficinry, to chun yc the bencf j1 op•: ion , to 
bor!:"ow on uuy ca!;h value, to terminate uny policy or co11Lrac:L, to 
receive cliv1drin ci s or oth e r puy ment!i, and Lo e xercise any ·1tl1t•r 
rights, p o 1<crs, privileges , or options. 1 11 co11junc:Lio11 .:ith this 
Lr u9t, St•lLl01· 1<iJJ liere11f t er or contemporaneously hcn,-,,tlJ <:':{C!Cute 
a will 14hir:ll j;Ju r s over cerLuin asseLs Lo t his t rusL . 
'.> . honcJ ancJ Com11ensution. 
!i . lC . No Done:! or Othe r Sccurit:y . No boncl or 1•Lh er 
securj t.y chul I be rr.quj_retl c,f the originnl •rru.stee or 11n; J<uccessoi:s 
thereto . Jf , desFitc Se,tt.lor'5 ' dircctionn, a bond is n,,,uirr•d by 
law, 1nsofor ,is il .l1cs w.ithin Settl or'5 p::iwer , Sclllor -1.i.rr,c:ts 
that 110 :;u n ,ty uc required o n such bond . 
~, . 20 . Co111pc:1H;ution . 1'rus Lee or tlle ~uc:ct:s :.,n 
t rus t e 1~ shc1 ! J t.,e 1:0111;,e11sated for sc:-\ll ces us s uch t n,~ l •: e a L Lile 
t r. en prcva, I i n cJ 1,JLes for similar uE:rviccs to esLiJLes 111.<1 tru~Ls 
I,, Ui_~;pus1Live Prov1s.:.ons . •r11e 'l'rustcc s ltu J · hnlci , 
mam1 9c, , i11vest and reinvest tJ1e tru~t assets, uml shilll collect 
t.t'1e i n c:0111!• l:iterco[ and s hall dispose o f U1e net incorm.: .ind orinc1pd. 
ilS fol l O\o.'!i : 
C, . l U , Jnco mc t o Settler. During Ute Jil1-,Li111•~ of Ute 
Settler , Trustee ~ltall pay to t.he Settler all of Ute ncL i!'1come 
£l t t.llllL'!; (JXt:ti bu t i.:L l(.:c1.~ t i!S of ~ CII D~ ill10Ui?l]y, n:,c.J, : r 1rtJct.i-
cable, i 11 rvyuJ1>r: tL011t.hly or gunrtcrly periodical puym(·nts . 111 
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oddi.t1011 Lo U11· J11t.:tJ111•.· 1 5cLl1or hcre~y cxµrcssl~1 re1s12rvl.~=.. 1..1itd n.:toJn~ 
tJ1e ri gli t, ~ol ,,11,- 1 i 1w: ,md [ r orn t J me t1> ti me, by ,, uo Li c:L· i 11 ,:r i LJ 11':/ 
signed Ji\' :;l' ltil'J .11111 dl'lJvi.:red tu the 'J'l"ll!!Lec LO w11lid1,I\..' !c!U•'h 
umounto fi:0 111 tin, p,J11c.i~a l of tJ,o 'l'rust O!l Settler m,1y CJL' !:ig11utc. 
ln the e ven t tili.lt: Set:tlor be co.nieJl'~incupocitated, Trustee lfld)' use 
!Y' 
as much of U:e jncome unc principal of . ::.he t rust for the b e nefit of 
' 
Se ttlor w; Trus t c u <leLt:r m.:.ncs shall be necesnnry for tJ1c !1upporl , 
care and 111u inte1111 11c!! of Set:Uor . 
G. 7.0 . Provision!; if _Spouse Survives. Upon the cleoLh of 
~he SetLlor, i f Se ttlur i~, sur vive d by SeLtlor's Spou!;e t:J. c- '!T ui:tce 
shall div1de I.Ill• Ln1:;L ussct!l into ·two (2) !lcparute Lt·u1;t.i; , hr.:rt!-
inafter dc,s J 'Jnated tt~ "'l'ile 1-11:ri tal DeducLion 'J'rust '' ancl "'l'hc Ft1111ily 
'!'rust", the :1:;s,, Ls , i11c:ludi11':J t.:U9h, of each trust to br f.:iir l;' 
reprcs enLi!tivc of uppn,ci,,tjon or clepreci ution i11 t lit:! value of ,ill 
property thus t.vu i lnlilt, for d i utributio11 in satisfac t.ion ,,! such 
and t o he uscertuincd ' o::;· follo1•19 : 
'J'he 11,,,ritol Deduction 'l'ruGt 9h!lll have as '..tu 
i nj ti a l corpus a :rac_tl.goa~ re of al l the_s.i;.u.s-1:: ✓ 
assets dctermi.neci ·<s follows: - - ---·---·· .. --
Thi,, tractionill nu~.rator shall be t11e m,1xi.1,1um 
al lowable iedernl estute tax marital deduction !·educed by 
the valt1e of all property i ncl ucli i.lle in Se ttler's gross 
estate for [cde r,il estate tax purposes which pas Ges 
t o Settlo1·'• spouse! under Settior ' s will, an/ o•· her. trust 
.iyrcc111e :1Ls, u11y l ife i nsurance pol icies, any jo i.nt 
tenanci es , or otherwise ·ancl which qual ifies for 1..he 
federal estate t ,1>: marital ded uction. 
'J'he fraction's denominator shall be the va:.ue 
ur Ill I th e trust illJ1;e ts. ' 
11 the amount of the initinl corpu!; produc, -i.! t.,y 
the ;,t,ove formula .L s nore than needed to comple•.t:ly 
eJi111Jnnte fedcrnl e state taxeo upon Settler's gron~ 
C!; l:..:i lt' (when consider.ing a ny nonprubate mari til l de-
ductio11 property, o ther dcclucti ons, exemptions, a nd 
cre<li L~), then th e 11molmt of the initial coruu~ sli<1ll 
bt! r.educed to ,111 umou11 t which is necessary tn c--·,11~,J 11 te 1 y 
e l.imi 11a l:e soid feder.111 e s tilt~ tnx or which i ~ ,,s close 
then,to as is pOs!;ible. It is Settler's Jnte11ti1>11 
by t:lw precedi ng sen tence LD uvoid an u1111ecesr..ir-,. 
nc:cur1111J 111.ion uf 11s sets 1d thin the feder1\l grcrns cs • .• ,Le 
o: s, •!. 1 l<,r 1 .r; Spour.r· . 
'l'h u Muotul. De duction 7'rust shal l not be rudu,:t,d 
;1 :: :! rr:!iUJ t of tc.lXf:! 5, e>:p<!l'lses, or de bt8 . Said j t r:: 1:u, 
sh11ll bt · pi11d u11ly itftcr providing the 1n1t:1c1J. c.YJ!'.pus 
J 
\I 
' I 
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<ll '1 1h1 1 M,11 il,ll L>edµction 'l'rust out of the l.ru~I. aSSC't.s. 
\ 
'l'lu.• r,1mily 'J'rust shall have as its inil:iol corpus the 
l;a:.,nce t.lf 11tn trunl nnsc,tA ofter deducting the n,001111t ,,l localod 
to the MariLol uoduction Trust. 
6.21. MQritzil Deduction Trust. After d.ivid.lng thlll trwst 
~l,~· ... J assets as here inabove provide cl, the .. Truatee shall pay to Settler's t~<r ·: ,:,-, 
,_ 
,• 
f. 
Spouse in ,ronthly or other oonvenient installments ~ll of the net 
income from the Maritlll Deduction Trust during the Spouse's 
lifetime. ln nddi tion, Settler's Spouse shall have the right by 
instrument in writing delivered to the Trustee and signed by the 
Spouse to withdraw from the Marital Deduction Trust such sums as 
the Spouse shall determine in the Spouse's sole discretion, up 
to and including the entire principal of 'l'he Marlt.al Deduction Trust. 
Upon the death o E the Spouse, the err us tee s llal l distribute the entire 
remaining prlncipul of The Marltal Deduction Trust as the Spouse 
shall appoint in the Spouse's will, free of this Trust, to the 
Spouse's estate or ln favor of any other person or persons. Such 
power of appointment shall be exercised in a will made -nfter Settler's 
death which specifically refers to the power of appointment herein 
given to t.he Spouse. lt is the intention of the SettlOT that the 
Spouse shall have the broadest possible power of appointment by 
will as to the principal of this Trust remaining at the Spouse's 
dea·th {which power shall be exercisable by the Spouse alonP. o.nd in 
all events), but in the event the S~ouse fails to exercise the 
Spouse's power or appointment, the remaining principal of The Marital 
1 
Deduction Tri.1st .shall become a part:. of The Fnmily Trust ru1d be 
disposed of i:i the same manner as the principal of The Family 'l'rust. 
6.22. Family Trust. After dividing the trust assets as 
nereabove provided, the Trustee shall pay to the Settlu1 's Spouse 
in nonthly or other convenient installnents, all of the uet income 
from The Family Tr\1!1 t during the Sp~uoe' s lifetime. l f at any time, 
ln the nbsolute discretion of the Trustee, the Spouse stiould for 
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.Jny ru1.1s,·11 !J• i11 110,,tl of !um.I~ fo r the Spuu!lc's pr.oµc:r c;,re, ,,i:1i11ten-
:u1cr .:ind •:111,1orl 1 t:hr, 'l'n1i;t1::!) lllilj' in 'J'1· us tr•t• 1r. 11b~1olut<• discretion 
pny co the Spt•L!Sl' o r ,1µµ1\' for U1c :1;:,ow;e•~. bP.11el .1t 1 in lldd~tiu11 
Lo u1e p1,y111e11Ls 1,,,rein provided tor the . Spouse, such IH~unta fr~tp 
thee principal of 'J'ht' Film.ily 'l'ru1;t:,.:,uP,; 1:.0 · the whoJ.e ·. thcreof, oo,lt11r ·+ ~ 
.. ,4 .. ' • 
'l'rus tee Hilt)' 1 rorn 1.ime to ti111f1 de01u necei;anry:i.,or · aclvisa.bll! for1· the - \~• ~ 
Spouse's ust~ anc1 be11c;Cit , 111 determining the nl!<::cl [or uuct, \Jll:tmcnts 
or applications, the 'l'rustce s l111l l tnke in to nccoun~ the income 
r ece ived by the Spou,:<: from '!'he Marital Deduction 'l'ruul ; provitlecJ , 
however, thnt nc pily1ucnt~ of prlucip,il r.lit1ll be made t o Lll!:' Spouse 
from 'l'he F'11111i Jy '1'rw1I unless U,c entire corpus o[ '!'he Mllrltal 
OtducLion 'l'l"USL hi.!,; !J&<-·11 completely CC>ll6Ull~~d . Upon t:he clei.llll o( 
Sttr.lor'!. Spouse.,, 1r ;,ny of SeLLl01:'s chllclren is liv.1.ng who iH 
under. cgc L1-1enty-ont' (7.1) , 'l'rusu,c i;h,,.ll pay to or upply for tile 
benef it. o~ Se1:L101· ' s child ren i ncllldi.n g tl1ose ch.U dr<::n who are age 
twenty-one (ll) o r older:, i.lS rnllch•or the net income uncl pr;,nc.ipal " 
o/<the trust as 'J01·ustcc i11 'l'rui;tee 1o tlii;cretion·<1eems nece,11Jary 
or approprliite ror thei t· proper support, care, mui.ntenance, and 
education, after U1kin\J i nto con!lideration the circwnstance~, the. 
size or tJ1c trust ci1tatP, antl tJw pro1J,1ble future needs of the 
beneficiadcs , and, to tllc, extent 'l'ru1ne e deems 1.1dviua1Jlc,, m1y other 
income or resources ol Settlor'!l ci1iltlren r.nown to Trustee. Any 
net inco me not disLri l.Jutcd r.hall be accwnulated and added to prin-
cipul . ln exercising the discretions herein conferred, Trustee 
may pay more to or oppl.y HYJre fo r:·· aonie beneficiaz:ies t11on oc.hero 
and rray mu):e payments to or upplici1tionu of benefits for one or 
rno re benc f1c 1 an.es Lo the e>:c:lus.ion oI o'.:lle1:-~ , Any pc.1y111e11t 01 
obligation c·~ benc f J ts pursuant t:c t:.h is subpara~n1pll slrnll ue charged 
against the tru~t c.,r-;t.11te ns n whole rnther than 119tii11st t:}1e ulti,na te 
distrihuLJVt> sha1·t: o( u be:,c:ficinry t o 1-11\0111 or ior whoi.,<: twnefit 
Trustee: by t.liio: p,11',1<.Jrilpl, 'l':-llstee is dit·ected tlwl primnry consider-
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utiun !Je qJ,1,·n l.o !it•t I lo r 1 s su1·vivlny rniuur cli i ld1er1 1nnsmuclt a!j 
lllE:)' !.ha! l 'ikc: l y l.,c, tJie ones wiLt1 th e:, yreuLest 11tied , i;i:1 r:lor fu .r ther 
purtLC\l!,,rl .\ di, .. ,·t ·: Trll!lLIJ(' tllllt !11 e>:1,rr.lal11y LIii.! dl~t: r1:llo11 
her.1:under , 'l'ruste:~ should rnal:l! ren:;c,n(tble u11 owance for tl1e degree 
. •d! 
a! eclut:i1Lio11ul expe1i,;w1 UL t.l1e w1dcrgrnduaLc c:~11.,9e and POAJiY.Cfd\ll!lt.f/?.f 
·-i, 
co.!.leye lev< J thi,l illll'c, be t!n t:xr~!::l~cl.c,d for: v1.u:i9u9 of SeLtl•,r,;. 1; · .,,. f 
ch.:.ldren an,: U\/1t shoul d lutl!r be expended fo r vorious uthr~r o of 
Sctclor'z cl:ilclrcn in order tCI trcnt !.iett:lor's chi~dre11 wi th !Jome 
degree of [; i r11r:!:s 1-:j t.h renpecL t u the: receipt of educ:atiorial funds 
from Settl e:, Sc,L ·:1 -.H·'s e~tt1Le, o L· ·inter vivos trust.s , 11nr testa-
mentary i:ru:-LB 1:i:t11 bJin ried hy Sett:l.or , or funds from M)' orhP. r source 
l;!manati11g [1 0111 Sc,cLlor , /It tltc time Se t: t l.or' s yt>\Hlgt->nt child reaches 
aye t1~ e11 ty-c-11c> (iJ) 11r1:.t'r Lhc, de;ith of: Scltlor' n !;pow;e, er al the 
time of th e cll•ath of Sc,t:ll or ' s !;pouGe if Settlor' s y u un<;1csL clulcl 
has already teaclt<?cl that .:ige, that is, when Sc,tLlor 1 !l Spouse i s 
no longer livi ng n11d no child of Sett.lor is livi119 who in w1d,er 
ag,; twen::y-one (2J J , t:J, e r.ntire p.r.l.~ci.pi,._l of tho l:.rufjt shilll,._ be ·:.;, 
distributed to or fo r the benefit o f m1y o ne or nore of Sectlor ' s 
_.,.,.-·· issue or Dpouses o f Settlor's dccea!lecl issue, as Settlo r'!i Spouse 
··!< shall. oi,point b)• cxcrci.sc o f 1.1 tent1.111t~ntnry exclusive special power 
of aµpo .i. nt111e11L, 1·1ld c l1 po101;1: ~: ltull be exercised by il wUl 111:ide after 
Se t tlor ' s death wluch s;,ec i r i c,,lly re fors to the ,~-:n1er of appointment 
herein given t o Scttlor' !. Spou~:e . Any ,1ppc, in tnm11 t by SetLlor' s 
Spouse 1112y hc of s uch tistate~ und i nt<~nc!st and qpon such -::.erm<: , 
trusts, co1\cl 1 Lion , , [..CJ1;ers and .!..i.111ita l. io11 11 as Set.::lot· ':; 5pousc sholl 
determl ne . /111y .i,1Foi nr.rncnt. muy excl ucle any one m:: m'.l re o[ tl1e 
benefici ar H!S of tli c clc1!;s . 1 f, or to tJtc cxt:e11t that , St->t tlo r' s 
Spouse does not exerci st :rnicJ testume11t<1ry spl,c.i.ul powe.r of a ppoint.ment 
ut. the dea t h of Set:tlo.:: 1 !1 S!-JOUs e , uuicl pi:incipt1.l Rh1.1ll pus:1 according 
to t11 e terms 9over11.iny ul L.i.111ute disLributio11 !let forth in !'a.z:.:igruph 
, of the Joinder 1,<:,ree1n!::11L . 
u. 30 . l' ro \· 1.si.011s if Spo use !):,e5 Nol Survive . I[ Settlo r'u 
.. 
. ·. 
Spouse sh.:ill predecease Sc tLlor, upon tJ1 e de ath of Seti::lor, all of th0·~ 
.,. 
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LTll'- ~ il~S()t.:: ;:II.ii l lw c:isLril>utcd (IS to.l lows : 
.1f n11y ul Settlo :: 's 
<:illlrirPn iF ii virr\, .~llu ,s u11dc1 ilge twr-!111:y-onc (21 ) , Trustee :1hi1ll 
p.ry lo LH -'l'l'lY lu r \1o1· l>Pnc·! I l of ScLl.:lor's chlldrt•11 111cludi119 
t..lrose c:l1ildn, 11 >1liu iHl! a9c twc,nty-orw (.!l) or o l <.lc~r, 11s much ot che 
. ··r- , .. 
net income onci pri11cjpel o f c.he tru!i\: os 'l'rus tee i. 11 'J'ru!ltr< e'n dis-
' 
. ~ 
care , .. , e re c.ion deems necei;sary or upp r opr i a L(: f or ur e.i r proper uupport , 
moinccnancc . n11cJ cc..iuc.:aLio11, u(ter tuY.ing into conH idcrntion th e 
circw1•sL1,m: ,· s, ::.lie ;;i,.c of Lhc trust es t ate, i!Ild the prouable future 
needs uf t:.h•· b£:11c>ficil1.ric.s, 011d, to the ,:,xtent 'J'ru:-i c.e e deen\9 i,dvis o.b l c , 
nny otlier i•1co111e or re!;ources of Settlor'B children known tu 'J'r us tee. 
flny rue l .income• 110L di Ht: r .ibuLr,d ii hull be ticc urnul,, tecl w1cJ Added t o 
pri ncipal . In l'XP:·ci. s.inc; th(• disc retions her ein conferred, Trus t ee 
mily pay morL· to or ttf)ply irore (or iw 111e 1Je11eiiciar ies thu11 others 
and may rnur.•: µuyments Lo en· nppli<:111:ions of benefit,; Lor :rne ur 
more l>cnefi-.:.iaricu to the ex<:lusiu11 o f otlrei: s . Any pi.lyment ur 
otiligution o[ benefits pursuant to r..h .is subpuragraph .<.1hall b e 
charye(l ug,un,;L the tr us t estu tc tl!l a whol e n 1t)i er t.hun ugainn t -~ 
t he ultimat•·: c.1istribu tive shore o[ a i.>crneficiur y to whc111 or for 
whose benefit t11e p11y 111t:11l. i!o 111ude . ln exercising the c]iscretio11s 
i mpo5ed uporr 'l'r11stee uy Lhi5 p11ragraph , 'l'r.ustee is directed tJ,at 
µri mary considerat.ion be given to Set t ler's sun,jvjn9 rninor children 
inas mucn as U,ey sh,d.l Jil:ely be the o nes wit lr the 9reate~1l need . 
Settler further p11rti:.:ulurly ui.rec t s 'l'r uste e t:..h,,L in e:xercisi11g 
the dir;cret.i on h1:reuncier, 'l'rustee altould m.ik e r eo!lo nuble ;il lowc.nce 
fo r t.ltc degree of educntional e xµc n ses at t he undergraduate college 
and pc,stgraclua::e colleye level tha t huve bc,en u:-:pcndNl for various 
o f SeLtlor ' :; childrnn and th.it uhoulc.!. late r b e i:,xpcndcd fur v a rio us ·J;~_',_ ,~ , .. 
i·:! :.-
o tb e rs of Settlor ' s clilldn,n i 11 u.ruc:r to tre at SetLlor'!i r:h ildren . , .. 
witlr some degret of Iuirneus wit li respect to t li e n·celpt of t•du-
cotionul fund:; :':nJJu Sr.!tt lur, Sr:ttlor ' :--: etilut l!, or i:iter v, vos 
t.rusts, t111y Le: £tauH2•n t ,1ry t l' U!iti; c:stublishe,J by Sc ttlor , or fund!l 
~ .. 
;, I 
' . 
i :i 
... :~ . . . .,. 
. ·r. 
". ~-~ 
. "': 
. . .L-1 
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fn11:1 d ll)' ot.111.-.- •;011r(:C· 1-111,11111ti11~ Jrom Settlor , /It l.llt• ti n-, St:ttlo r• 5 
youngest •~hild rei,t.:l1C,1, "':1" twenty-one (t.JJ afte r tl1e dCill11 of Settlor , 
o r uL tl1C' ti 1n,: of Ll11, de,11 /1 of 1;c:,Lt;lor lf Sct t lor'::; youngest child 
he~ alrec:dy ,:11acl!('u cr1;e \wi,,:, Ly - u111: (,1), that ls, when :;etLJor is 
no lor,ge:: l.Lvi.n\J a11cl no c.:hJ.lcl of Sc ttl or is under 1190 t:1,· c11Ly-ono 
, . • 1.: , , . 
tl1e cn1:ire princip,1.l of the trust sho.J.1 be distributed acco:rti ing 
( 2l ) I,,' ,,:j ?,:. 'I·~ 
I " ' ,~ " : ~ ~ } ").~u• t.o •, ~ 
·~~: 
the te r ms govr.rning ul Li 111ate cii!iLril>utit,n s et forth in l'arngraph 
·; of the Joincier t.grel:'m,,nt'. 
7 . Particular lns Lructionr. to 'I'rusr.ec . 
7 . l.O . Thirty - Duy Survivorship . 111 determi ning bene-
ficiaries of l:he trusts created herein, o l>eneficiu1·y 111lall be deemed 
tc ha ve survived the !:.etllor., w1 in1iurecl 1 uny other person , ,3 point 
in time, or an event, HD tlie c a!;e 1111.1y b<i, only if sucll survivorohip 
is for at leo1~t tl1lrty ()O) days . f'rovicled , however, thi!l cl.ause 
shall noc up!JlY j 11 an1• c:ase where itu appliclltion would cause nny 
prov is i on of th is instrument, which 1;0 uld otherwise l..>e v a J id, to 
t i be void wH.ler any applicable rule n;1a mit perpetuitie!l 1 rule limi.ting 
suspension o f tlle power of alienad.on, or other sind.lar rule . 
7 . 20, M.ingli11y Sepurute ~•r usts . 'l'ru!ltee i!J 1:lut.hori:z.ed 
to ming l e the properties of the S!:!puraLe trust!! created by ci1ls 
Maste r 'l'r ust /,grec,111:s11L, ul!otlny to each l.lepurute trust wi und5.vicJed 
interest in tJ, e mi ngled funds, Hllic!1 undivided interest alwuys 
shall be equ<>.l t!J thnr. tru~t• s pr::,por. t ionute con t ribution (a~ 
adjusted from time to time us a rl!s ult of uccumulutlons of income, 
pai•ments of p::incipul, 11dditiono w pr incipa l , etc , } oo the mingled 
f unds . It is Settloi·'s intention thut cuch tz:ust bcncficiaz:y shall 
have 11 separate illld discinct trus::. 1 and the provision~ of tll lo 
paragraph 7 . 20 urc merely de signed to permit 'l'r us::ce ::.o uvo i cJ a 
dil'is.Lon ln l;i11cl .ill ;iccon;pli!;hing Scttlor 1 o i ntention. 
7 . 30 . T~r111i.nution of 'J'::usts . lf at uny ti11Y-! a ll y 
s cpa ra te trl!!;::. 110!; D fJt~ i 11c ipal o f lann -:.hau $5,000 in va luc, tl1 en 
'I':rusc.ee s:iuU d~l iver the c:nt:1L·e pri ncipnl to the 13epurate trust 
~ , · ,., .. ·.•.".. 
i..t.~111 .... ·..L::t..t,.-'- •- . t · .. /. 
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bcnr:fic.:inry . Jl· the bc11ef;ciury .is 11:JL ubJe to mun,19e 111s or lier 
uffairs (in Tru~ t.!•c':; !;uJ.e d.i,;crc,tio11) , tilen 'l'rw,tce nwy, in 1·r ustee ' • 
sol<, dl:.;cn, Lion, d1, J ivc· r th<· 1;epu.n1tr- trust pr.inc.ipuJ r.o t:hc leyal 
guilrd.ian 
of tJieO~sL:.::s :~c~:i;o:::::~icl:::~·~ut r .cgui·d to ' ru,y'~f;. t•~· 
legul n,stdctlon5 o t hcrwiLle 
0
tlpplicable -t:.o trustceo'.,· f~-
the 1•n1stee is uuthorl zed iru1d empowered, in •rrua14e!a.l .. )'f · 
i;ole nnd absolute! discretion, to e:xerciDe the ''t:'r:' : 
follm,·.ing dii,ci-etionary powers no well an nny o t h er . 
powers c..-on[errcd by lm1, not inconsistent with other 
p ro v isions of tJ1i!; trust : · 
U, l<l, Tu r.t:Luin, whet:her cr i y.inl1lly a p11rt of 
c.he ,:rui;;t: estnce or subs~guently acquired , and 
to pllr.chase or othendae acquire and to retain, 
t1ny pn,p<,r ty, whether or not such property iR auth-
or izt.>cl for .lnventmcnt by law , or i ll UJllH!cured, 
unproducLlve , 01· of a wan ti ng nature , all wit hout 
di versi fic11tiu11 un to r,lnd und a no unt . 
f! . 7.0 'J'o r. ran:.fer., scll, exchunge, purtitio11, 
Je,1se, nortgn<Jl:', cr!:ute a security intere!lt i n , 
µlecl<;<J, ,ii.ve optionA llpon, or otherwit1e diapour• of 
any proper.ty ut uny Lime lw J.cl by 'l'r uutee, at p11l.ll ic 
or private suJe-: or ot:herwi!;e, for cash or othec 
c-onnlde=atio11 or on credit, una upon such termo and 
condll"iorrn, ~ii.th or without necurlty, <111Cl for such 
price, O!; •1·r.u!lt<:e m11y dete1:minc . 
8,30 , 'l'o huJd any pnrt of th e trunl estole 
in c111;h or unj11v<estecl for ony period deemed uclvisable . 
U.40 . 'l'o extend, nodify, or waive the terms 
of any note.• ;;m cl rrortgage at any time fo rming part. 
of th e· Lrusc ; t o foreclose a n y s uch 11ortguye c,r. tar.e 
titl e to Ute property securing it by uecd ir, Ji.cu 
o! forcclcsurc or u t herwiHc ; to pl"Dtect u r rcdnem 
any such properly from for.feitut:e for nonpayrne1,t 
of wr.e:; or utlicr lieno; i:.lnd <JErnernlly to exercis e 
us to s uch bt>nd aud m:1rtguye or su ch p r operty ul l 
pov1ers \;11 ut nn ui,5alute owner might exc re i se . 
U, !iu . '!'o e xer.c.;ise aay option, riyltt, u1 pr.ivilc9c to 
converL l.,011di;;, notcn, corporat:e shnres, or ot:her 
securit:ies, or to subscrl.bc for addit ional or ot:her 
·1·, .. bonds, notes, corpo rate Ghnrcs , or other securities ; to mnr.e such con ver~ions or subscriptions ; to mn•.c 
pilyments there for, uncl t o ndva11ce or borrow noney 
for the purpose of cxercisin<: any £:uch option, right 
or pr i vi loye; a11d to hold as investments such bondr; , 
uoLei;, cor.por;itc shun,s, ,ind other oecurjtiC:s so 
a cquired , no twith:\\:.andin9 t11ut they ore not of n 
char.icter t,uthori•~ccl for i nvestment:.s by low or by 
other provisions a f this ngrc:emen t . 
8 . GO. 1'0 vote uny corpor<\ te shnrc~r; itP ld by 
T:-llf:L0<' in person, th:-ough 'l'r.u!;tee 1 ~ de!.ii9r,c~B, or 
by proxy, with or without power of subst:. i tutiun , 
nncl Lu ,,xr-cutr- nut:ho:::- ity o:::- r,roxioo to one> or more 
dcslc;nc c~ 01· no mineen . 
e. ·10. 'l'o Uorrow 1101v:• y !or U!l}' tr·ust µurpoac 
( ~-
. ' '; 
. ~;,::;i. 
t'~!-
. '(:;• ~' ·~ .}~ ~--~~- .. . 
(t ,_.J 
l'.,i\ 
-~ 
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,111d 1.-, pl t1cl9e al J ur pllrt u[ tl1e• t.rus t e~ c;n:c ,.o 
, .. ec·L1n· ,:ucl1 bo r ro1..-iny, without incurri ng any per,-;o nal 
l .i ubj Ii I:\' ~here [or. 
11,Ull . 'J'u fJ/1\', r,xtcrntl, re111,w, 01odJf:r, or "ll 111-
prornlsc1, upon such terms as 1J1ru!itee may determine, 
1,1ml upQ n s uc:h evJ.dence .ns 'l'r.ustec m11y deem sufficient, 
a ny obligation or clidm, J ncluding t11xes, el tiler 
in favor of or ilguinst tl1c tn.?!lt es t 1Jte , 
0. 90 , 7'o hold o r reglDter any securitir~s or 
otlle1· rrnpc-rty of the trust ent.nte in th e name of 
u 11omi n1::e or in zuch forrn till to pass by del :i very, 
1~itl1 or with out i ndicuti11g tJ1e fid\1ci ary, charucter 
c, f such securities or other property , 
U. 91 . 'l'o divide and distribute the trus·t esta t e 
in f:i.ncl o~ in money, or pc1rtl1• in each, .o r by wuy 
of u11divi.cied interests, ,md for !Juch purposes to 
value nny propert)' to be t hu:i dlv1c1ecl 01· disr.ribut.etl 
nt foir rnilr);et va l ues ,:rt the date or dates .of .di!ltri-
butl.on. 
Y . /lccounting by '!'rustee. '!'he- Trustee shall :•.eep ull 
accourt ts ,rnd J"C!cords of the trus ta c 1:eatr!d hcz:ein !lnd a nnuul ly, 
or oftener, sh,11.l render to the current l.11co11ie beneiiciarie!l :;tate-
111e nts slww:ing u ll receipt:s , disbursements , ,ind distributions of 
,both principi'll .:i11c! i11corue of the 1:ruGt estate. 
10. Spendthri:t Cluui;e . No intereat o ·f any beneficiary 
under any trusts crentccl herei ii either in income or in princ.ipul 
shall l;e s ub ject to pledge, aesignment, sale , or t ·ransfer in any 
manner nor. sllilll n11y bene ficj ary lwve the power in ""Y monncr 
t0 antici.pat;.P, char:ge, or encumber his interes t , either in income 
o r pcillcJpiJl, nar sl1i.ill such i.ntenii;t of u11y !Jcrieficiary be l i ilble 
or subje,:cL in Dr1y manner !or the debt:;, con.t!'.ncts, J.i,,bi.lit:ies, 
en9ay(H11e11ts, or t oL· ts of suc:1 bene(iciar y . 
ll . IJebts, Taxe!: und B>:pe nse!i . Upon t: • .he de<1tl1 cd 
Se t t lor , tJ,c 1'?·m;tr,e shall p a y all deb ta, to r.es and expensef; 
and lD.!H . .illne ss cxpe11,5es resul t ing £rum 
t.tl.or . directs othendse in 
;,~ .'iJ•:J~ ?., ; . 
:reuentative or other peraon 
,, '·" !l,J,Yl<li . 
1 !J· f
1 
,.~1v1 It 
t~'W"""P~.:·,:p,ny estate, inher i -
·.t ;. ·:-'~i':., • • ~ '111 •• • • 
1;>00,1;, .. to any or all of the 
' fli", '/• 
~iliJltPBa eatai:e of tJ1e 
:r':l1ffll' ' 
:t, 
000154 
37 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-~-""'~t ,. 
-12 -
SettJ.or, the, 'l'rustce shall re.imburse such personal reprei;entative 
-~ 
or other: pen,1J11 ilcting in a JiducJ.nry cap.1city for· til e .. uoount of ouch 
ta:ws unless f;ei:tloi: clire::cl'.s otller1vbe J.n Settlor 1 !3 ~, ill . H tJie 
Sµnuse o( thrJ ScttJ.or. nh11ll Gurvivc the Settlor, ull •j uch 
trust e&tate shal l be paid out of 
' 
i n P1,n, graph l; , 22, 
12. Sltlt~, . 'l'hiB 'l'rust !:hall not takf.' effect until ti1e: 
execution of this H9reeme11t i.Jy both the Settlor and the 1'rus,tee , 
and it. shall be goverm::d and construed in all rcr,pect:.s according 
to the law.= of the Si;ac.e o f Utah , 
1 3, Miscclluneou!.i . ;~ ) The singulnr shall be i n terpreted tis .. -r 
ti1e plui:;i.l, ,mo vie!? versa, 1£ such :.:reatmenl is necessary ·to 
intei:p re t tl, is t r u~; L agreement i n accord 1.ith Set tlor ' s nianifes.t 
intention . L.i~.ewise, if e.ither the fi!min.i11e, masculine, or neuter 
yen<ler siioultl be 0111;" of the other genders , it ahall be so t.reatod. 
~•tie parngrapl: and s ubparagraph headings u~ cd hei:e in uni merely 
rndlces !or Settlor':; 0~111 use and uhull not be considered in the 
interpretat i on of this Lrusl agreemen::. 
SIGNED the cluy u11d year fir!lt above rnnnlionr;,d, 
/ i : ') 
' •· "". / 
,,{:I, ,- ,•:. ,,.r. u .. .....r, '-- ~· 
SE7'TLOH 
'l'HUS'J'EC: 
. l '• \ 
!1 •· 
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.,__.,_.--· 
JOlNDER AGREEMENl' 
TI\P. DUANE BOREN FAMlLY LIVING TRUS'J' 
J. Integration. This Joinder. Agreement, t;oqe\ t;,:•r wi tli 
the MAS'fER '{'RUST AGREEMENT executed contemporaneously herewj th 
shall toget!,er form a separate .and distinct Trust Agre-r.>111e11t. 
2. ~. The name of the Trust shall be 'l'he L'IIANE 
SOREN Family Living Trust. 
3. Settlor. The Settlor of the Trust is DUANI:, BURl::N 1J! 
itoosevel t, lltah. 
4. !r~.. The 'l'rustee of the Trust j s SIIAflHOI, ANI~ 
ANDERTON of Roosevelt, Utah, DUANE: BOREN, JR. of Rooi:;i;•vPlt, Utah, 
i 1 r1I TE~~y LE.6" /L'\QAJKJ t,\-' ,f.'\',·101- 1, Lf'\,l\fl 
and MARY EL',EN OL,/\NCHAR~ of Roosevelt, Utah.1/)as Co-tn11~l-.?es, 
sometimes her..<="inafter referred to by the -singular dP.si•Jnution 
0 Trustee 11 • 
...... 
5. Sb Trustee. _ _... ______ _ incl iv id Ui.1 ls namc-1 I 
as 
Trustee or by written notice to 
the income hen7Hc iar ies of the the, 
_,,,, 
successo~hall be appointed as heretofore 
/ 6. Spouse. Whenever the term 11Settlor 1 s r.pc)csc" or 
the equivalent is used in this Joinder Agreement or the MASTER 
TRUST AGREEMEN'J' I it shall mean SHERRON LEA BOREN. 
7. Ultimate Distributive Share. Upon tlu=> ultimate 
distributio,l of trust property as provided for in either Pnrayrnph 
6.22 or 6.30 r.1f the Mil.STER TRUST AGR8EMEN'r, Trustt?~ shall 
distribut(• tl!C"> I.rust estate as follows: 
{.I) 'l'rustee shall distribute the real r>:.L.,,,, 1ef'Prr1?•l 
to by Sett: In,· M, "the mountain ground" (ond some!· i111r•i; hy Ll11• 
Clesignatlon "tlH' T\llen Draw Allotment") together witli t.he- min.-.r.-11 
riyhts Lo ,·tJ I r• 1 ,·d ,,.st,1te owned by the t:rust P.lJUH I I y 1111, ,:i~J 
Settlor.•~ ~ix dd.ldren: Sli/\RHOL ANN l\NIH~H'fON, Pll/\NP. I\CIH!•:!•J, JH., 
MAH Y l·:1,1,1•:11 111,/\Nt ·111\ HU, 'l'f::HH Y 1,1·:I:: MUNKS, l>AV l U Ll•;N I!' •111.11 1 mid 1,111· I'·, 
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,J . l!,: .. Hi•:N. Ii ,Ill)' or SeLtlo1·'s diilcli:t~/l is IIOL 1. 111'11 ::ll"/1 V j11g , llu; 
l'rnvj ,Jc •d, i:· n11 y •>f' th~• chilrJre11, rlurinn tl,£,it· lil•·I iu,,·, de· i11,• 1,, 
i;cll t l 1t"! 1111, , 111L;ii11 <Jround o ,: the 111i11cral right!l, ll11' <1l.li•,r 
then-]ivin\J child r e 11 shall have a r ight o[ first rPfu~;;,I , 
(l) '!'r:11st:0 e !:ihnlJ. dir;tribute t he sur[,n;,, ri q hlB 1.r:, ,i.11 
other te;,d ·~Lc•l. r. CIJUal.ly to D/IVID LEN BOHEN c1n cl I.I.IC:,: Y ,I. ll() lll·:l•J . 
lf either i ,, not t:ltc 11 surviving, hi!l !!hurt:, shall pil :; ::; 1. 0 his iss1w 
in per s t i,·pes shu ces . 
(~) 'l'rustee s ha ll distribute all the res L, r~r.ichce ond 
remainder !Jf the? t rust e s t a te in egual s hares to S<>ttlor's six 
child1:en c1 hovE.' narnecl . If any of Settlor- ' s ch i lrlre11 ii; nvl. t lcen 
su r vivi11q, 11i:,; 1.i1 .. h<~r share sh,d] pass l.o his 01: ht,i · i~;s\•c in ,.,cec 
F.,1L·h s ha ,:e so a]loclltecl shall be distrib11J:1~rl tu hi111 , l11· t · 
or then: f ,·r, ·• w1cl c .1 ear of trust . Uut if there be no living 
benef ic:iari,is ot the abo ve allocaLions, t he princi.paJ oi t:li(• 
shall b1., di •.;t r i lJut:ed to the persor1 or pe1·so nc who wo1 1ld he 
I ,· u,;L 
Sett.1<11: ' s twi , :; ;1l: lu\s' i f Sel:Llor liiid :;u,:vivetl t:lce l t· 1111 i11uliu11 1,I 
this trust, ,mil then diea , d<~ tennined as of the dale ,.J/ :::uch 
t:en11inat i c,11 u 11d c1ccot:d ing t o the lows of Utah then i11 furce 
.respecti 119 • 11 L •~stc1te succession . 
U. Particula r lnstructions Reqan5i11g S(:L\· Jc.,r.'._:?. 
Busi n e ss . i'IOL>ii tl1standing a 11yth i11y contc,ined in Lh i i-; d<J i nd1~ r 
Ag ree 111<mt or 1'.he Mf\S'J'ER THUS'!' /\GRCf.MEl~'J' t o the co11l.r,1r y , il ,'1 I t·I, ,, 
t i me t,f. sr:-1 1 !1.,r ' r: rJ~ath , Settler owns or otherwisi: r·(111 1.n>i.r; a n 
i nte r c~;t i11 1111 :,yril'ultui:aJ. b usine:;s, 1aliich pas.se:; u., 'l'ru.s l r:e , ,J11ti 
Settler's :;pv11~<? su r vives Settlor , tlc en Settlor ' s ~:1,1,u:sr• slt;.:11 
h,1ve \.11l' 1·i()ht~:: To direct '.l'rusLee Lo r eti,in the r;1,irJ ln ,i~.i11P. !',:t •,1· 
any part. then:11 f; to direct Trus tee at any U111e to :;, .. JJ ,.,. 
'fr u s tc-•r• <1 1 t111y t 1111••· t.o rent: 0 1· JC:.•u ~e t:he ou~1n'?sr; ,,r .-11,·_1 !•i1rL 
t:hP.rc:or; .i11tl 11, rlirP<:t 'l'rur;fr•f:' ;)l tJJJ)' t i me l.CJ hir r• ", ... ,.•o1i1, 
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indi•Jiriu,il ;:ir: qr~ncraJ mc1nc1~1H· of the business at: sueh s,,1 ,,r·y as 
S::>tt.lor ':; .;pow:<: :;l,a.l I uetcnnine. lf or: to Lhc c·>:l. •·1,1 i :'!tlh,r'·: 
spo use shr.1:J not r~r.er.cise any of the 1~ights herein c<,nlvrr.-c·d, Lhe 
saicl ri9hL :,: :;l 1.:i l L l,c excn:iscd by '.J'1: ust<:e in 'J'rw,1,, , , ' :; ::o l•·· 
discret:.io11 . 
9. f_.losely 'l'imcd Ueaths. 'J'he pn.>ccctt11 1 • wi I I> re::p1•cl· to 
surv i vo1·s ldp set for.1:h j r, P.:ir.agraph 7.:, U of the MltS'l'l·: 11 '!'HU::'.I' 
/\GHBEMEN'J' s l>alJ no t ctppl.y a~. between Scttl.01: and Se t· LI or's spou se . 
If thet·e js any question wlrntsoever as to tlJeir dua tl, :; , tl11•n 
Se t t lor• ~~ spouse shall be deemed to have surv iv ed Sel. 1.lor . 
D/\'.l'EU this30 __ clay of }}l,t,/1 !... J '! 
/, 
• ( / I I ;- ; •I• 
DUlltm BOREN 
:-:;-:'l"J'l ,Oll 
SH/\HHOL /INN /1.NV/::H.'/Ul•I 
DU/\IH: BOREN, J H. 
MARY ELL!(N !3L/\NCII/\HIJ 
- -------·-
. l 1,-•.v .._ .S 
( t • / ,:•11 , 1, 
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'J'J·JE DUl\NE 1301lEN 
FAMILY LIVING T"UST 
:--.il'lll-:IJI II.F. [W l,IF'E INSURANCE !\ND ()'j'fl[:; H l1!;sw1·s 
If,'(;• 
------ C<.~11y ----
l'ol icy 
Humber /\1U-JIJlll 
----------------------- -- -
~ -- ------d,7·7JI /. I - ,. ::;;rc-c t,,,-y 1 ·1_y lt,1; 1, er,.,, /, , (--i -1--14'5"_ ('r,1 . 
c OMNe.12 c:dJL- JSJ?1-1 f,0';_-' s· £1 &. 201 ]'313 
SH;J,J[;!) tllis _)_.::, clay of )Ii• •' ( /. J. 9 
-~-~- . 
_/ 
'( . , • LL- , I • -•·• •• 
DUANE OOHEN 
!jE'l"l' J ,! >H 
Sll/\RHOI, l\NN illWl·:H·J•()M 
DU Alm BOHl~N, ~I H. 
1-1,\HY t l.,l,EI~ HL/\IH'lli11i1J 
..{;(:.)-!!.' ll.Us.:J:.1~£ .. :: 
i- I 1;-,._; J·, l 
r u · -, l'·ZvJ·-,: , 
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AM~NUMEN'r 'J'O 
'l'llf.! 1)1,1 I\ H ·~ llOH P.N F' AMI LY f., r VI NC~ 'PR us ·r 
'l'll I~ /\Ml~NDMBNT is executed this I • ..... dny of j =:.:. - ·-.:t i •• 
} 
( , , .- ): t.:__· _. ··---·-..... ·-, 19 ~Li_, be tween DIJ 1\NR BORF.:N, S0 tr. 1 or il nu 
! 
SHERRON Lfu~ DOR~N, Trustee. 
Settler desires to amend that certain trust known 
as "The Duan0 Bor.en Family Living Trust", which instrument 
was executed by S0I·. tlor and SHARROL ANN ANDER'l'ON, IJUI\NE 
BOREN, JR., MARY P.fJLEN BLANCHARD, and TERRY L~E MONf~S on 
March 20., 19B0. 
Pursu;rnt to the power reserved by Settlor tr:i amr-~nd 
the sr-tid '1.'ru~t .,t: nny tim<;., Settler hereby dP.cl.nr,,r.; 1 h:'ll: t·li'"' 
said 'f'r.us t shn 11. lir, mnP.nded by changing Paragrr1ph 4 of f:Jir, 
the Joind<-~r l\gr'"''='"''·"'nt to the Duane Boren Family J.i vi.ng '?'n1 1;t 
to read as follows: 
•
11 4. 'l'rustee. '!'he Trustee of. the 't'rust is 
SFJE'Rtrott-b~A-·B0-R-B~l_ of Roosevelt, Utah." 
r!.}1tV1Jset€fotf-'t-!Jt~er desires to amend the sn id Joi ndcr 
Ag r G emr~ 11 t to t I".. .c:; ., i a t r us t by a cl a i n g the r.e to P cl r.:, g r n p h '3 t· o· 
rend «~ follnws: 
t15. Successor 'l'rustee. If the named tnw tr._,0 
shall f;::Jil~ or cease to serve as trustee for any 
r.~nson n t·. ;,ny t i.m0, the successor !:;trnl 1 br~ RJ1l\HIUH, 
l\NN l\Nt>lrn'l'ON, l)lJJ\NE RORF.N, JR.., M/\aY P.LI,l~N 
BLANCHARD ;rnd 'l'P.HRY f.,P.P. MONKS, as co-trust~("'!-,. 
IE any of: f·.hr-' individuals named as successor 
r.o-tru~,=~-,,...'": ~hi\1 l fni l or. cer.1se to s~rve f0r -,ny 
r (') il so 11 n I: : , n y ~- i rw:1 , t h ,~ r em ;i i n i n g .i n d i. v i < l ll ;.lf ", 
000162 
45 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
silal I. co1il:inur·, l: o ,,erve . 'L'cui-;lJ::e 111ay resi.gn by 
wri tV!n notic1·• 1·.o 1·.h0. i.ncome beneficiaries of t·. hr:· 
,.,r,f,-.,cf· iv 1: d:11·.,~ , wJir,! r.e11 p on t.he Sllcc: r.:'flSOI'.' sh;:1.l I l)p 
appoi r1t ,_,r1 ,.l !> IH·'1"(0•1·.ofore declar.ed. 
S0ti:lor ,.l i~clares that any language cont.:1ined i n 
'l'he Ou.01ne Bo r ('ll F;1111 ·i ly Living Trus t wh.i.ch .i.s inco11 si.str~nt 
wi th th.i.s A1ne11<Jment:. shall be construed, changed, or 
e.l..i.m i. nat.ed so 1-1s tn be co nsistent with this a mendment . 
By si~Jn .i.n~J this Amendment, S1-J ERRON J.,l!:l\ BOR EN, 
Trust'?. P. , agrer~s l.. rJ be bound by the provi~:;ions conl:c:1i.ned i.n 
the original tJ~usl: instrument . 
lN l•/ JTll!L::SS WHJ.mtmF , this 1\meridment has be,=in 
exec u ted t.he day ;rnrl y ea.r first above vn:i.tten . 
( 
·-; 
: ·.c.'· -· --'----- ' - -"-' 
DUl\M E BOH El~ 
S l·'.T'I' L OH 
, I 
I 
I J 
( ./ , ' < , / ,'( I I I • 
: I • - --
SHEHlWN 1.F:/\ BO IU~N 
'l'HIJS'J'EF: 
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SECOND AMENDMENT TO 
'l1JlE DU7\NP. DOREN FAMILY LIVING TRUST 
THIS l\MENDMEN'J' ir:: executed this ., r:.J ., I.I dr1y of 
____ ,._.•· ..... '.._ ... _. _______ ·' lCl 
-----~-' between DUANE BOREN, as Scttl or. and 
SHERRON LEA BOREN, ns 'J'n1!; tee. 
Sett 1 or des i r.c-r. to nmend that certain trust known as "The 
Duane Boren Family LivlntJ ·1•rust 11 , which instrument was executed by 
Settler and Shn.r.ro.l l\nn l\nderton, Duane Boren, Jr., Mr1ry Ellen 
Blanchard and Terry Lee MonJ.~s on the 20th day of March, 1980 and 
which trust wi,~ sul>::Pqur--111 I y nmcndcd by n Fir:::;t Amendment cJ;,tf\cJ th0. 
5th day of January, J~)H!), which Amendment among other thin9s, 
replaced the tru~tr0r-; wirh Sherron Lea Boren. 
Pursunnt to thr~ power reserved by Settlor to amend th0. 
said Trust at any U m0, Sf"ttJ or hereby declares that the m, id Trust 
shall be amended a second time by changing Paragraph 5 of the 
Joinder Agreement t· n rc-;3d ar. f o 11 ows: 
"5. Sqccessor Trustee. If the named 
trustee shaJ 1 fail or cease to serve as 
trust8e for n ny reason at n ny time, the 
successor shrtl l be chosen from the following 
individuols with the order of listing being 
the order of preference: D7\VID LEN BOREN, 
SHJ\RROL l\NN J\f·Jl)Jm'I'ON, DU/\NE f3OHEN, JR., MARY· 
ET.1.,J::N lll.l\1-JC'lll\lW, ·n:rmv J.F:r-: MOl'll(S '11ld HJCJ<Y a. 
BOREN. If any of the named individuals shall 
fail or ccnsn to serve for any reason at any 
t.i me, tl10 11r:>:t: !:~toted order of pre·ferencc 
st1r-Lll ser.-vc. Trustee mny rr.sign by writtc11 
notice to th0. income beneficiaries of the 
0. ff ect iv~ ctc1 t".C', w!1c r.0.u po n the s u cccssor sha J ] 
b C ti r r O i n t 0 cl (l ~~ h (' r. C t-. 0 f Or G de C 1 n r 0. d • " 
Settlor aJ.so l10n1by cleclares that the said Trust shall be 
further amended by d1nnr1 i IHJ p,·:-iri1q raph 7 of tlw Joinder Aqn.=ement to 
read as fo 11 0 1.-.1~~: 
000165 
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"7 . _i ;11;it~f-.. Pi/;_[~Li.trn.!._i .'!§. ... J--il1 Upon 
the 1.1I.Li111 c1l- dist.cibut.ion of trust p101 .-ty ar,; 
pro\· irlccl for in e:i.thE!r pari:lgn.1phs 6 . 2?. or 6 . JO 
of [· It::! Mi\.r.;•n :n 'l' IWS'I' l\Gl{T::EMEN'I', 'J'rust.ee shn 11 
d.i.sr.r.ibul:.e i·J,c, trust 0sl:.,1te ,u::: fo.llm•1s : 
( J) '!'nid.(ic shall distribute i:111 
t1g1·iculh11;1I r•qu ·i.pment·, all J:i v1=1stocl<, ;1.ll 
1,1at0 1~ ri9ilt.~, .-,11cl the surface r.i.ghts to ;;i.1.] 
cu J !:. :i. v i:1 ted, p;1 r,t. u re or hay ground ( c11 J. rea J 
estatr-! other than 11 v!i.1[,;te g.round 11 ) to Dl1VID J.,EJ>l 
BOHf::N ,-111cl 1,r1r ·1-:v .-1. Flonr:N in r:::qual :,:;/rnres, pe1:· 
sUrpe::;. 
( 7) '.l'nt!-~t. c,e sha] 1 di.std bute aJ.J. " wast0 
grollnd 11 :i 11 r nu 1· ( ,1) equal shares among Sll11RR0J., 
l\NN /\Nnlm'J'Dl·I , Dl.1 /\l·IF: BOHEN / an . I Ml\RY ELT.l':i'/ 
BLl\NCHl\ lW i:llld ·n:rrnY l.,l!:E; MOH J<.S in per sti rpE!S 
shares. 
(J) 'J'n1::: t.ee sha1J clistr.i.butG aJ..l. mineral 
rights as follows : Fifty percent (5 0 %) shaJ.l 
be distributed equally to DAVID LEN BOREN and 
LUCJ<Y J . oorn:1-1 i.n per st.irpes shares . 'I'he 
rernc1i 11 in9 -i- i rty pe ,~cent ( 50!1:) shall be 
clistri.buted 0~r~u<.1.i. ly among Settlor I s folJ.O\•d nq 
four ('1 ) c:llildren : SHARROL ANN ANDER'l'ON I 
DUANE 13CIH F:H, ,JR . , MAHY ELLEN BLANCIIARD ancJ 
'1.'EHHY J.,EE MOl·IJ·:s . 
(/4) 'l'nr:-,t.ec ~; h c.1JJ cli r:; t r i .bute all the 
rest , r.c::;iclue ;-ind remainder o-f the estate .i.n 
six (G) equ,11 s;ll;ires a mong SettJ.or ' s six (G) 
children nc1med ;~bove, with the provision that 
if a ny of tile c liildrc.=rn 21re not then surviving, 
his or her ,'. /i ,,re s l 1r:l.1 l pa~~,;; to his or hr,!J~ 
issue per s t.Jrpes . 
E,1c: h :,.han=. so allocated shaJ.l be 
cl:ir:;t-rJl-Htf-.N·I tn h :i m, Iler 01: th8 m free and c:J.e r.ir 
of t.rust . But j .f th enc• are no J :i.v j 119 
benefic:iad.ct.'. of the above c111ocat.i.ons, t h e 
principa l or the trust shalJ be distributed to 
the person o, .. perf.;ons \,;!10 \•1ould be Settlor I s 
Ji, ... j 1. :·: : 1 I I . 1 L,' i ,- r; ,, 1· r l Cl T: IJ ; 1 d : ; l 1 1 V i \Ir. d t) l r, 
tr.1:111.i 11.i!.i(111 1 >.l. t:11.i:·; t·. n1,::t, ,'l 11 c..l t. licn cl.ir:11, 
clctenn:i 11r,r1 ;1,-. uf tl11-! d,1te of: ~:;ucll ten1d.nat :i 0 11 
;,rn l ,-ll'1:(11 ·di1;q Lo t: ]1r, .lr:1\•n:: of Utah then i 11 
r o n_·c: 1·r-·:·: 1 ,, ·c · I· i n,J .int r;: ; t c1 te :,:ucc0.:,;1:; i.on . 11 
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Boren Fc1m.i .ly l,jv.i. 1H 1 .=;l. 1-1l1:icll .u:; .i.11ccH11:;j_ :,.tc.. _ .th t.ll.i.s !31:!cond 
Amendment :-:;Jin.l.i iw cri11::i· 1-- 11,:• ,. I, c ll,:1nqecl, or r:<Jjni:i.na tecl so as to be to 
be consistent 1,,1 .i tli l: lli :,·, l\111(•J1~lm•I!llt . 
J.1.1 \-i'.l'l'NF:Sf_;; \·lill::111':0f-', l:llis Sc::cond l\me ndment l1;c1r; he(rn 
executed tho tLiy ;1 1Hl )'(',11 I ir:·;L· .-tl.>ovo 1-njltc-! n. 
, , 
- ·-- -· ----------··---··---- ---- ------·--·-- ~----·-l)IJMIE BOREN 
I: 1-:•J" J' J ,I 1f) 
-· - -·-··- · -·---- ---·-·-···-- --
~;111::HHOl-l .U·:/1 J.IUHEN 
T P IJ f,;'J 'J .J-: 
BOREN DU . l-\M D 
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